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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Foreign Direct Investment: Definitions,
Recent Trends, and Issues of Concern
Over the last two decades worldwide production and consumption of goods
and services have become increasingly internationalized. Globalization is
characterized by an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) and inter-
national trade. FDI by multinational enterprises is one of its most striking
signs growing both in absolute terms and relative to trade. The increasing
importance of FDI is reflected, furthermore, in the fact that it grew by 18
per cent in the year 2000 as highlighted in the United Nations’ 2001 World
Investment Report (UNCTAD [2001]). This trend is accompanied by a grow-
ing interest of economists in the determinants of foreign direct investment.
Different branches of economics aim to explain its causes and consequences.
From an international finance and macroeconomic perspective, FDI is seen
as a particular form of the flow of capital across national borders. There-
fore, the determinants of the flows of investment and the stock of capital
controlled by a foreign investor in another country are of profound interest.
On the other hand, the motivation for direct investment in a foreign country
from the investor’s point of view is analyzed on a microeconomic level. The
consequences to the investor, as well as to home and host country, are the
focus of the present examinations.
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Before coming to the main empirical observations and theoretical find-
ings, as regards foreign direct investment, it is useful to define the term FDI.
There does not exist a general definition of what foreign direct investment
specifies. However, most definitions share common features that distinguish
FDI from portfolio investment and other arrangements. “Foreign direct in-
vestment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident
entity in one economy (“direct investor”) in an entity resident in an econ-
omy other than that of the investor (“direct investment enterprise”). The
lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the
direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the
management of the enterprise”, (IMF [1993] and OECD [1996]). The United
Nations’ 2001 World Investment Report defines FDI as “an investment in-
volving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control
of a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enter-
prise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign
direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate)”.1
Common to both kinds of definitions are the terms degree of influence and
control. Both are important aspects that distinguish foreign direct invest-
ment from portfolio investment. In contrast, a portfolio investment which
typically is undertaken by pension funds or trust funds involves a smaller
share of ownership and, mostly, a short term time horizon. These investors
usually do not directly take part in the management of the company of in-
vestment and are in this sense passive. On the other hand, exercising control
over its local subsidiary is the main interest of the investor of a foreign direct
investment.
To give an overview of the recent trends in foreign direct investment and
an impression of its volume and importance, let us report on the FDI flows
and stocks. FDI flows comprise capital provided (either directly or through
other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise,
or capital received from an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor. Flows
1A “lasting interest” is identified with at least 10 per cent ownership by the foreign
direct investor.
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consist of three components: Equity capital, reinvested earnings, and intra-
company loans. FDI stocks represent the value of the share of their capital
and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise,
plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise.2
Table 1.1 shows FDI inflows and outflows for selected regions during the
period 1995-2000 and an average number for the period 1989-1994.3
Table 1.1: FDI inflows and outflows (Billions of US dollars)
Region/country 1989-94∗ 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Inflows
European Union 76.6 113.5 109.6 127.6 261.1 467.2 617.3
USA 42.5 58.8 84.5 103.4 174.4 295.0 281.1
Developing countries 59.6 113.3 152.5 187.4 188.4 222.0 240.2
Japan 1.0 0.0 0.2 3.2 3.3 12.7 8.2
CEE 3.4 14.3 12.7 19.2 21.0 23.2 25.4
World 200.2 331.1 384.9 477.9 692.5 1075.1 1270.8
Outflows
European Union 105.2 159.0 183.2 220.4 454.3 720.1 773.0
USA 49.0 92.1 84.4 95.8 131.0 142.6 139.3
Developing countries 24.9 49.0 57.6 65.8 37.8 58.0 99.6
Japan 29.6 22.5 23.4 26.1 24.2 22.7 32.9
CEE 0.1 0.5 1.1 3.4 2.1 2.1 4.0
World 228.3 355.3 391.6 466.0 711.9 1005.8 1149.9
Note: ∗Annual average.
Source: UNCTAD [2001].
The first thing to note is the rapid growth of FDI flows. Between 1995
and 2000 total FDI inflows nearly quadrupled, reaching a maximum value of
2UNCTAD [2001].
3The numbers are on a net basis, i.e. as capital transactions’ credits less debits between
direct investors and their foreign affiliates. Net decreases in assets (FDI outward) or net
increases in liabilities (FDI inward) are recorded as credits (recorded with a positive sign
in the balance of payments), while net increases in assets or net decreases in liabilities
are recorded as debits (recorded with a negative sign in the balance of payments). The
negative signs are deleted for convenience, (UNCTAD [2001]).
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close to 1.3 trillion US dollars.4 A second striking fact is that the majority of
foreign direct investment takes place between developed countries. Within
this group the European Union, USA, and Japan accounted for 71.3 per cent
of world inflows and 82.2 per cent of world outflows in 2000. The share
of inflows to developing countries decreased slightly to 19 per cent in 2000.
The countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) received 25.4 billion US
dollars, retaining a share of roughly 2 per cent of world inflows.
Table 1.2 reports on the stocks of FDI for various years.5
Table 1.2: FDI inward and outward stocks (Billions of US dollars)
Region/country 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000
Inward stocks
European Union 185.7 236.5 739.6 1131.4 1835.1 2376.2
USA 83.1 184.6 394.9 535.6 965.6 1238.6
Developing countries 240.8 347.2 487.7 849.4 1740.4 1979.3
Japan 3.3 4.7 9.9 33.5 46.1 54.3
CEE - 0.1 3.0 36.4 102.0 124.7
World 615.8 893.6 1888.7 2937.5 5196.1 6314.3
Outward stocks
European Union 213.0 293.1 790.3 1312.5 2448.7 3110.9
USA 220.2 251.0 430.5 699.0 1130.8 1244.7
Developing countries 16.5 32.6 79.8 252.9 611.4 710.3
Japan 19.6 44.0 201.4 238.5 248.8 281.7
CEE 0.0 0.0 0.4 5.4 13.5 17.4
World 523.9 707.8 1717.4 2879.4 5004.8 5976.2
Source: UNCTAD [2001].
The observed trends for FDI flows are reflected in the stocks of FDI, too.
The European Union, USA, and Japan accounted for 58.1 per cent of inward
4The discrepancy between the total numbers for world inflows and outflows, which
should theoretically be the same, arises due to measurement errors.
5FDI stocks are estimated by either cumulating FDI flows over a period of time, or
adding flows to an FDI stock that has been obtained for a particular year from national of-
ficial sources or the IMF data series on assets and liabilities of direct investment (UNCTAD
[2001]).
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and 77.6 per cent of outward stocks. The share of inward FDI stocks in
developing countries is 20.2 per cent and for countries in CEE 2 per cent.
Foreign Direct Investment may either involve the establishment of a new
facility, a so-called greenfield investment, or the acquisition (of shares) of an
existing company. Acquisitions are generally subsumed with mergers under
the title mergers and acquisitions (M&A). However, the major part of M&A
are classified as acquisitions, while only about 3 per cent are mergers.6
Table 1.3: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Billions of US dollars)
Region/country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Sales
European Union 55.3 75.1 81.9 114.6 187.9 357.3 586.5
USA 44.7 53.2 68.1 81.7 209.6 251.9 324.4
Developing countries 14.9 16.0 34.7 64.6 80.8 73.6 69.7
Japan 0.8 0.5 1.7 3.1 4.0 16.4 15.5
CEE 1.3 5.9 3.6 5.5 5.1 9.2 16.9
World 127.1 186. 6 227.0 304.9 531.7 766.0 1143.8
Purchases
European Union 63.9 81.4 96.7 142.1 284.4 517.2 801.8
USA 28.5 57.3 60.7 80.9 137.4 120.3 159.3
Developing countries 10.2 12.8 28.1 32.5 19.2 57.7 42.1
Japan 1.1 3.9 5.7 2.8 1.3 10.5 20.9
CEE 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 1.0 1.5 1.7
World 127.1 186.6 227.0 304.9 531.7 766.0 1143.8
Source: UNCTAD [2001].
As can be seen from Table 1.3, cross-border M&A have been tremendously
increasing. The value of M&A in 2000 was almost 9 times the one of 1994.7
Moreover, M&A seem to be the main stimulus behind foreign direct invest-
ment, as a comparison of Table 1.1 and Table 1.3 reveals. For the year 2000
worldwide M&A accounted for over 90 per cent of FDI inflows as well as out-
flows. However, it should be noted that the value of cross-border M&A and
6See UNCTAD [2000], p. xix.
7For a more detailed overview on trends in cross-border M&A and strategic alliances
see OECD [2001].
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FDI flows are not exactly comparable due to different measuring methodolo-
gies and statistical reasons.8 For example, payments for M&A can be phased
over several years.9 Nevertheless, the statistics indicate a clear trend.
In contrast, the picture is very different for developing and CEE coun-
tries. For developing countries in 2000 M&A sales, as a percentage of FDI
inflows, accounted for 29 per cent and M&A purchases for 42.3 per cent of
FDI outflows. For CEE countries M&A sales made up 39.7 per cent in 1999
and 66.5 per cent in 2000 of FDI inflows. For German FDI in Eastern Eu-
rope Marin, Lorentowicz and Raubold [2002] report a similar pattern based
on a survey of 1050 investment projects. They further find that in 1997
about 44 per cent of FDI flows were accounted for by M&A, 56 per cent
by greenfield investments. However, independently of the country of origin
a clear shift away from greenfield investment towards M&A over time can
be observed. Meyer [1998] also finds that greenfield investment is the most
common mode of entry into CEE countries, accounting for about 53 per cent
of all projects in his 1994 sample. Interestingly, he finds that entry into fast-
growing industries in CEE takes place via greenfield investment but not via
acquisition. This is particularly surprising, since for entry into fast-growing
industries M&A are expected to be more attractive due to providing a fast
entry opportunity. In contrast to this observation Caves and Mehra [1986]
find the opposite result for entry into the US which lends support to the fast
access argument. Thus, it becomes obvious that the mode of foreign entry in
choosing between greenfield investment and acquisition depends on country
or regional characteristics such as the level of development. The remaining
question is, what determines the choice of entry mode? And moreover, how
do various market or country characteristics affect this choice?
The increasing general interest of economists in FDI is, on the one hand,
stimulated by the rapid growth and high volume: Foreign direct investment
seems to be an important stimulus for economic growth, and it acts as a
8See OECD [2001], p. 19 or UNCTAD [2001], p. 289.
9For an example see UNCTAD [1999], p. 8.
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channel for transfer of technology and know-how. By attracting FDI host
countries hope to gain access to advanced technologies and skills. FDI may
result in benefits to the host country, even if the multinational retains full
control over its foreign subsidiary. On the other hand, there are various is-
sues of concern on both sides of the investment, i.e. home country and the
host country. These concerns are of economic, social, political, and cultural
nature. In particular, the strong involvement of M&A has raised a number
of worries.10 Cross-border M&A are often viewed differently than purely
national arrangements from a policy making point of view. Most countries
prefer to retain local control of domestic firms. Some countries therefore
restricted inward FDI in several ways. Greenfield investments seem to be
more welcomed than acquisitions. The conventional argument in this re-
spect is that acquisitions are a less beneficial mode of entry with respect to
the economic development of a country since they do not add up to local ca-
pacity. From a home country perspective the concerns center around worries
that outward FDI may substitute for domestic investment and for domestic
workforce. Thus, foreign direct investment can generate inequalities and un-
employment in the home country. Moreover, it is feared that foreign direct
investment results in a loss of technological leadership of the host country.
On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that multinationals must invest
abroad in order to stay competitive in a world of increasing globalization.
All of these considerations emphasize the necessity of a sound economic
analysis which helps to assess the validity of the various concerns.11 There-
fore, the driving forces behind FDI and the chosen organizational form, i.e.
joint ventures versus wholly owned subsidiaries and greenfield investment
versus acquisition, need a careful examination.
10The World Investment Report 2000 (UNCTAD [2000]) provides an overview of the
effects of different entry modes on economic development and concerns of host and home
countries towards FDI.
11Recent experiences with financial crises in some developing countries have also lead to
a controversial discussion about the risks and benefits of FDI. See for instance Albuquerque
[2000], Hausmann and Ferna´ndez-Arias [2000], Krugman [2000] and Lipsey [2001].
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1.2 Theories of Foreign Direct Investment and
Empirical Evidence
Whenever a multinational enterprise (MNE) invests in a foreign country it
faces several obstacles and disadvantages of doing business abroad, i.e. the
MNE has to incur certain costs attributable to its foreign operation.12 These
costs of business in a foreign country are caused, for example, by communi-
cation costs, transportation costs, cultural differences or lack of local expe-
rience. Therefore, the MNE must, on the other hand, possess certain advan-
tages over the domestic firms which more than outweigh these costs. This
argument dates back to Hymer [1976]. More formally Dunning [1977] intro-
duced a framework to identify the advantages and conditions under which
FDI should occur.13 According to the “eclectic paradigm” three conditions
have to be met for a foreign direct investment to be an advantageous ar-
rangement: Ownership, location, and internalization (OLI) advantages.14 A
firm’s ownership advantage could be a product or a superior production pro-
cess. Thus, the firm owns a value creating asset or possesses a particular skill
which is superior to domestic firms. The location advantage makes it more
profitable for the firm to produce in the foreign country instead of, for exam-
ple, producing in the home country and exporting its products. Moreover,
there must exist some internalization advantage such that it is preferable
to have production integrated within the firm rather than choosing armth-
length agreements such as licensing or strategic alliances.
The OLI approach provides a useful framework to analyze some of the
main economic mechanisms behind FDI, and it helps to explain the emer-
gence of FDI. Two types of foreign direct investment can be distinguished
by their different motivations. A horizontal FDI involves the duplication of
12Caves [1996] provides a thorough review of the literature on the MNE. See also Moosa
[2002] for an overview of theory and evidence of FDI.
13See also Dunning [1981] for a full account of the “eclectic paradigm”. Dunning [1988]
and Dunning [1993] provide a re-statement and possible extensions.
14See Markusen [1995] for an overview and a discussion of the OLI framework.
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production sites in more than one country with the purpose of serving the
respective market in the country of investment.15 The other possible in-
vestment form is vertical FDI. A vertical foreign direct investment is carried
out to exploit factor price differences between countries.16 It thus involves a
fragmentation of the production process across countries. Most of the foreign
direct investment seems to be horizontal in the sense that output of foreign
affiliates is predominantly sold in the foreign country as shown by Brainard
[1997].17 Both types of FDI are usually analyzed in separate frameworks.
Only recently, there have been attempts to incorporate both approaches
within a unified framework called the “knowledge-capital model”.18 The
OLI framework does not explicitly differentiate between both types of FDI
but it is applicable to both of them.
Brainard [1997] moreover reports that multinational activity is more likely,
the more similar the markets of home country and host country. Industri-
alized countries predominantly serve as source and destination markets for
FDI simultaneously.19 These empirical observations stand in contrast to ear-
lier explanations of FDI in the line of traditional trade theory which argued
that firms integrate production vertically across borders to take advantage
of factor price differentials (e.g. Helpman [1984], Helpman and Krugman
[1985], Ethier and Horn [1990]). However, it is not surprising that in tran-
sition economies and CEE countries vertical FDI plays a prominent role.20
Nevertheless, most of foreign direct investment seems to be explained by a
horizontal expansion of production across borders that is more likely, the
higher transport costs and trade barriers, the lower investment barriers, and
the lower scale economies at the plant level.
15Horstmann and Markusen [1992], Markusen and Venables [1998], and Markusen and
Venables [2000] offer theoretical models with endogenous formation of horizontal MNEs.
16See Helpman [1984] and Helpman and Krugman [1985] for theories of vertical FDI.
17See also the earlier version of Brainard [1993].
18See Carr, Markusen and Maskus [2001] and the literature cited therein.
19This pattern is also reported in Julius [1990].
20Marin et al. [2002] report evidence for vertical FDI for German investors in CEE.
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The choice between FDI and other ways of serving a foreign market
has been the focus of examination in a series of studies. Horstmann and
Markusen [1987] analyze the choice between exporting, licensing, and FDI.
They show how a reputation argument may serve in favor of FDI. Other
studies on the choice among alternative ways of serving a foreign market in-
clude Ethier [1986] and Ethier and Markusen [1996].21 Motta [1992] shows in
a game-theoretic model that a tariff may cause a shift away from FDI or oth-
erwise induce a tariff-jumping investment, depending on the host country’s
market size.22 Whether or not it is in the interest of a country to impose
tariffs or quotas strongly depends on the market conditions which may lead
to ambiguous welfare effects. Opposed to tariffs, it is frequently observed
that countries offer tax incentives or subsidies as a means to induce import
substituting FDI.23
Despite the fact that by far the largest part of FDI takes the form of
M&A, the question of the choice of entry mode has received relatively little
attention in the economic literature. This is even more surprising in the
light of some of the public concerns related to the expansion strategies of
MNEs, and in the light of differing trends in different regions of the world.
Empirically a number of important factors that determine the choice of entry
mode have been identified as statistically significant: R&D intensity, firm
size and diversification, foreign experience and cultural distance, and relative
size of investment. Hennart and Park [1993] and Andersson and Svensson
[1994] found that firms with higher R&D intensity are more likely to choose
greenfield investment. Large and diversified firms prefer acquisitions as Caves
and Mehra [1986] and Zejan [1990] showed. Kogut and Singh [1988] found
that with a greater cultural distance between home and host country of the
21See also Horstmann and Markusen [1992].
22The model is essentially an extension of Smith [1987] who also showed that a tariff
may, under certain conditions, deter FDI.
23For theoretical models see, for example, Haaparanta [1996], Haaland and Wooton
[1999], and Haufler and Wooton [1999]. Schnitzer [1999] presents a rational for the phe-
nomenon of tax holidays in a dynamic model of FDI.
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investor, the firm will more likely choose greenfield investment. Another
finding states that the relative size of investment compared to the size of the
investing company makes acquisition more favorable as shown in Caves and
Mehra [1986], Kogut and Singh [1988], and Hennart and Park [1993]. Finally,
a positive time trend towards acquisitions has been stated in the literature
(Caves and Mehra [1986], Zejan [1990], and Andersson and Svensson [1994]).
While some empirical studies have been done on this issue, there exist
relatively few theoretical models that deal with the choice of entry mode.
Buckely and Casson [1998] and Go¨rg [2000] argue that the market structure
and the intensity of competition in a particular market are important de-
terminants of the decision between greenfield investment and acquisition.24
Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi [2001] analyze how the choice of entry mode
affects the extent of technology transfer and the degree of competition in
the host country. Horn and Persson [2001a] analyze the equilibrium market
structure in an international oligopoly and focus on the question under which
circumstances cross-border M&A or domestic M&A evolve. They do not,
however, consider greenfield investment as an alternative mode of entry.25
Norba¨ck and Persson [2001] consider privatization allowing for greenfield in-
vestment as an option.26 Their model suggests that low greenfield costs and
low trade costs induce foreign acquisitions.27 This seems to be counterintu-
itive on first sight but the result hinges on the fact that the acquisition price is
endogenously determined and negatively related to the aforementioned costs.
The second strategic decision regarding the organizational form of FDI
24Sometimes the term “brownfield investment” is used to describe a situation where
the investment is formally an acquisition but resembles a greenfield investment. Meyer
and Estrin [2001] argue that this concept is useful to describe acquisitions in transition
economies.
25See also Horn and Persson [2001b] for a game-theoretic analysis of merger formation.
26For overviews of the privatization literature see, for example, Schmidt and Schnitzer
[1997] or Megginson and Netter [2001].
27See also Bjorvatn [2001] for a theoretical model of the choice between exports, green-
field investment or acquisition. Norba¨ck and Persson [2002] analyze the choice between
cross-border acquisitions and greenfield entry in a multi-firm setting.
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is related to the question of ownership structure and control. In princi-
ple, multinational firms prefer to have a wholly owned or majority-owned
subsidiary since that inhibits several advantageous features such as better
protection of specific knowledge. However, there are good reasons why a
MNE would voluntarily agree to share ownership in a joint venture. The
local partner might, for example, provide valuable assets. Joint ventures are
also used as a means of mitigating the problem of sovereign risk.28 Moreover,
governments sometimes simply restrict entry to joint ventures and sharing of
foreign ownership.29
The existing theories of the determinants of ownership structures are
based on three approaches: the transaction costs approach, the property
rights approach, and the bargaining approach. The transaction costs ap-
proach pioneered in Klein, Crawford and Alchian [1978], Williamson [1975]
and Williamson [1985] stresses the possibility of opportunistic behavior once
an investment is sunk. This in turn has negative effects on the incentives to
invest in the beginning. Anderson and Gatignon [1986] argue that a greater
level of control is more efficient for highly transaction-specific assets.30 Em-
pirical evidence for a negative correlation between intangible assets and the
probability of shared ownership is found, for example, in Gatignon and An-
derson [1988] or Asiedu and Esfahani [2001].
The property rights approach developed by Grossman and Hart [1986]
and Hart and Moore [1990] formalizes the notion of asset specificity and
analyzes the effect of ownership structures on investment incentives. Joint
ownership is in this framework usually suboptimal due to sharing of residual
control rights.
The bargaining approach, which was put forward by Svejnar and Smith
28Schnitzer [2002] gives a rational for this phenomenon.
29Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi [2001] provide an argument for host country intervention,
in order to induce the MNE to choose the socially preferred entry mode, and to transfer
appropriate technology.
30See also Gomes-Casseres [1989] and Asiedu and Esfahani [2001] for transaction cost
approaches to ownership structures in foreign subsidiaries.
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[1984] and extended in Al-Saadon and Das [1996], analyzes how the owner-
ship distribution depends on the bargaining power of the MNE and the host
country (partners). Svejnar and Smith [1984] show that the distribution of
profits in a joint venture is independent of actual ownership shares, though
depending on the bargaining powers of the parties. Gatignon and Anderson
[1988], Gomes-Casseres [1990] and Henisz [2000] found evidence that joint
ownership is likely to be chosen in bargains with host country governments.
In particular, the probability of joint ownership is increasing in the political
risk associated with a foreign country.
FDI generally involves the transfer of financial capital and/or of technol-
ogy. It therefore may have positive as well as negative effects on the home
and host country.31 One important aspect of why countries try to attract
FDI is the prospect of getting access to advanced technologies. The benefits
to host countries may inhibit various kinds of externalities, often referred to
as spillovers. The effects on home countries are usually not called spillovers,
even though there exist similarities to host country effects. The literature
on home country effects of FDI is somewhat limited.32 Probably the most
important question in this field is the effect of foreign production on home
country production and on labor demand. The evidence on both topics is
ambiguous. As Blomstro¨m, Fors and Lipsey [1997] argue, it is very difficult to
judge whether production by foreign subsidiaries is actually a substitute or a
complement to domestic production. However, there exists some evidence of
substitutional effects of foreign production.33 There exists a large and grow-
ing literature concerning the transfer of technologies across countries through
31See Blomstro¨m and Kokko [1998] for a recent survey on multinational corporations
and spillovers. For a broader view and an assessment of the costs and benefits of FDI see
Dunning [2000].
32See Blomstro¨m and Kokko [1994] for a survey.
33Blomstro¨m et al. [1997] found opposing results for Swedish or US firms. Brainard and
Riker [1997] conclude that there is only a modest substitution between foreign affiliate
employment and parent company employment.
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FDI and its impact on foreign production.34 Theoretical studies include, for
example, Findlay [1978], Das [1987], Wang [1990] and Wang and Blomstro¨m
[1992]. The empirical evidence on the impact of FDI on the productivity of
domestic firms is mixed. Evidence for positive spillovers is found in Kokko
[1994], Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee [1998] and Xu [2000]. Other studies
found significant negative effects, e.g. Haddad and Harrison [1993], Aitken
and Harrison [1999] or Djankov and Hoekman [2000].
This thesis contributes to the existing theoretical literature in several
ways: In particular, we ask in chapter 2 how the choice of entry mode is
affected by the market structure and the competition intensity within a mar-
ket. In chapter 3, we analyze the impact of technology spillovers on the
entry mode choice. Furthermore, we ask how asymmetric information over
potential technology spillovers affects the decision between greenfield invest-
ment and acquisition. Finally, chapter 4 examines the effect of technology
spillovers on the incentives to transfer technology and on the host country
policy incentives. In more detail, we ask how these incentives can be con-
trolled via the ownership structure in an international joint venture. The
following sections give a brief introduction to each of the remaining chapters
of the present work.
1.3 Modes of Foreign Entry: Greenfield In-
vestment versus Acquisition
When a multinational firm enters a new market by foreign direct investment,
it faces two strategic decisions concerning the organizational form: 1. The
level of control over the local subsidiary has to be determined. Therefore,
the MNE can choose between a wholly owned subsidiary or a joint venture
agreement with a local partner. Both types of ownership structures differ
considerably in their level of control, resource commitment, and risk. 2. The
mode of foreign entry has to be determined: The MNE can choose between
34See also Saggi [2002] for a survey on international technology transfer and spillovers.
19
a greenfield investment or the acquisition of an existing company.
Chapter 2 analyzes the choice of entry mode between setting up a new
venture by greenfield investment or the acquisition of a local competitor. We
therefore abstract from the other strategic entry choice and assume a wholly
owned arrangement to be the desired ownership structure of the multina-
tional enterprise.35 In particular, we analyze the effects of different market
parameters on the entry mode choice. Among other parameters, the mar-
ket structure and the competition intensity in a market have already been
identified as being crucial for the decision in the preceding literature.36 The
market structure is determined by the number of firms active in a market.
Competition intensity, on the other hand, reflects the strength of competition
which in turn may depend on the nature of competition, i.e. price or quantity
competition. In contrast to existing approaches, chapter 2 exactly analyzes
how the entry mode decision is affected by these parameters. Therefore, the
acquisition price and the profits under both entry modes are endogenously
determined in this model.
Our conclusion from this chapter is that the competition intensity within
a market is indeed a crucial factor for the entry mode choice. In particular,
we show that the decision might be affected by the competition intensity in a
non-monotonic way. When markets are very much or very little competitive,
greenfield investment is the optimal entry mode, while for intermediate values
it is acquisition. Moreover, we find that greenfield investment is the optimal
mode of entry only if the technology gap between the domestic firm and the
MNE is sufficiently large.
Regarding the empirically observed behavior, the conclusions of chap-
ter 2 can help to understand some of the underlying economic mechanisms.
Empirical evidence highlights that entry into countries in Central and East-
ern Europe mainly takes place by greenfield investment, which contrasts the
worldwide trend towards M&A. Companies within these countries certainly
35However, our results still hold for shared ownership arrangements as long as the sharing
rule for the profits is the same for both entry modes.
36See, for example, Buckely and Casson [1998] or Go¨rg [2000].
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often possess inferior technologies. In this case our model predicts that green-
field investment is the optimal mode of entry and vice versa for entry into
developed countries. Moreover, concerning the observation that for entry
into fast-growing industries in CEE countries greenfield investment is the
preferred entry mode, one could argue that these industries can be associ-
ated with low competition intensity. Therefore, greenfield investment should
indeed be the optimal mode of entry.
1.4 Modes of Foreign Entry under Potential
Technology Spillovers
Entry into a foreign market by a multinational enterprise may have a direct
effect on domestic firms by inducing a spillover. Foreign direct investment
might thereby benefit direct competitors to the MNE or companies in related
industries. In fact from the point of view of the host country the possibility
of technology spillovers is often seen as one of the major motivations to
attract FDI. If such a spillover benefits a competing company, it hurts in
turn the MNE. In this case the possibility of a technology spillover may have
an impact on the strategic entry decision. This is certainly the case if the
extent of the spillover depends on the choice of entry mode.
In chapter 3, we analyze the effect of technology spillovers on the entry
mode choice. Again, the acquisition price and the profits for the multina-
tional enterprise under both modes of entry are derived endogenously in the
model. The multinational enterprise can choose between a greenfield invest-
ment or the acquisition of its single competitor in the foreign market. In case
of greenfield investment the MNE may induce a spillover on its competitor,
thereby weakening its very own competitive position. On the other hand,
if the MNE chooses acquisition no spillover occurs, since there is no other
“recipient” firm in the same market.37 Therefore, by choosing acquisition
37A spillover might benefit a company in another industry, which would in our model
have no effect on the decisions of the MNE.
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the MNE can avoid a potential spillover. Thus, one might expect that the
prospect of a potential spillover has the effect that acquisition becomes more
attractive relative to greenfield investment. Interestingly, however, a first
conclusion from chapter 3 is that the general effect of a potential technology
spillover on the entry mode choice crucially depends on the nature of compe-
tition. With quantity competition a spillover is a hindrance to acquisitions
and has thus exactly the opposite effect as expected. For price competi-
tion and horizontally differentiated products we show that the existence of a
spillover has the expected impact on the choice of entry mode.
In the context of spillovers of know-how and technology it seems natural
to assume that the parties involved may have asymmetric information about
the potential for a spillover. How does this affect the choice of entry mode?
In the second part of chapter 3, we show that asymmetric information has a
negative effect on the overall acquisition activity. Furthermore, this result is
independent of the form of competition. However, under certain conditions
private information about a potential spillover may result in acquisitions
which would otherwise not have taken place under perfect information. A
comparison of different informational scenarios additionally reveals that from
an ex ante view the entering multinational firm always prefers full information
rather than being privately informed. The domestic firm, on the other hand,
is better off with private information about the potential technology spillover.
The results of chapter 3 are consistent with empirical evidence which
suggests that greenfield investment is the more efficient mode of entry for
investors with strong competitive advantages.38 Furthermore, it is observed
that spillovers are more likely generated if the technology gap between the
MNE and domestic firms is not too large.39 In our model a spillover occurs
only in case of greenfield investment. As we can show, greenfield investment
is the optimal mode of entry for intermediate technology differences if the
probability of a spillover is high.
38Hennart and Park [1993] and Andersson and Svensson [1994] found evidence that more
R&D intensive firms, i.e. firms with technological skills, favor greenfield investment.
39See Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee [1998] and Xu [2000].
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1.5 Technology Transfer and Spillovers in In-
ternational Joint Ventures
Choosing the appropriate ownership structure for the foreign engagement
is an important strategic decision for the multinational enterprise. Foreign
direct investment can either take the form of a wholly owned subsidiary
or of a joint venture agreement with local partners. Since FDI is seen as
an important channel for the transfer of technology and know-how, and as a
source for the diffusion of technology, governments sometimes restrict FDI to
joint ventures. This has been prominent, for example, in transition economies
and CEE countries.
The ownership structure is particularly important when the multinational
enterprise possesses valuable intangible assets or superior production tech-
nologies. Sharing of ownership can in this case give rise to the possibility
of technology spillovers. As Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm [1999] point out, it is
generally believed that local participation with multinationals reveals the
MNE’s proprietary knowledge and in that way facilitates spillovers. This in
turn could have negative effects on the incentives to transfer technology for
the MNE.40 But, on the other hand, there exist good reasons why it might
be in the interest of the multinational to voluntarily form a joint venture
with a local partner. It might be the case that the local partner is able to
provide valuable assets, market informations or linkages with related indus-
tries. Another issue which is important for entry into transition economies
and CEE countries is the fact that direct investments are subject to sovereign
risks. After the investment is sunk the government of the host country may
be tempted to expropriate the assets of the FDI either directly or indirectly
through excessive taxation. As a direct result of this the incentives to invest
at all or to transfer technology are reduced for the MNE.41 However, if the
40Ramachandran [1993] shows that with a greater level of control over the foreign affiliate
a more sophisticated technology would be transferred.
41Huizinga [1995] shows that in order to reduce the benefit of expropriation, the MNE
transfers an inferior technology, even if the technology transfer itself is costless.
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ownership is shared with a local firm the MNE might be able to mitigate the
sovereign risk problem as shown in Schnitzer [2002].
In the final chapter of the present work, we analyze the effects of a poten-
tial spillover on the incentives for a multinational firm to transfer technology
and on the host country policy. Moreover, we ask how these incentives can
be controlled through the ownership structure in an international joint ven-
ture. In contrast to existing arguments we can conclude from chapter 4 that
a spillover need not in general have a negative effect on the incentive to
transfer technology. As we show, a spillover can even have positive effects
on the technology transfer and on the efficiency of the investment project.
Additionally, we find that independently of the effect of a spillover sharing of
ownership may sometimes be beneficial for the MNE. On the contrary, how-
ever, we show that a joint venture agreement is not always in the interest of
the host country. This finding is particularly interesting in the light of the
frequently imposed restrictions on foreign ownership. As we can conclude
from our analysis these restrictions need not in general have the desired ef-
fects but may result instead in adverse effects on the incentives to transfer
technology. This in turn lowers also the potential for technology spillovers.
The results of chapter 4 shed some light on the empirical evidence which
suggests that spillovers from foreign direct investment may be significant,
but they are by no means guaranteed in their extent. The empirical evidence
on the impact of the degree of foreign ownership on the degree of spillovers
to the domestic sector is ambiguous.42 Our model indicates that the extent
of spillovers not only depends on the ownership structure but also on the
incentives to transfer technology and on the host country’s policy incentives.
Hence, whether or not a larger ownership share of a domestic firm results
in stronger spillovers is a priori not clear and can differ across countries and
industries.
42While Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm [1999] found no effect, Dimelis and Louri [2002] found
evidence that the degree of foreign ownership indeed matters concerning the potential for
spillovers.
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Chapter 2
Analyzing Modes of Foreign
Entry: Greenfield Investment
versus Acquisition
2.1 Introduction
A multinational enterprise considering entry into a foreign market faces two
fundamental decisions. First, it has to choose the level of control over its local
engagement. Equity-based entry could take the form of partially owned sub-
sidiaries, as in joint ventures, or wholly owned subsidiaries, while non-equity
entry would be licensing for example. Second, the MNE has to decide which
mode of foreign entry to carry out. It can choose between the acquisition of
an existing company or setting up a new venture via greenfield investment.
Why would a multinational firm choose to enter one market via acquisition
and another one through greenfield investment, while in principle for either
market both alternatives are present?
This chapter contributes to answering this question by providing a simple
model to analyze determinants of the optimal entry mode. For this purpose
we consider the decision to enter a market either via a greenfield investment
or the acquisition of a single local competitor. While a general analysis of
this strategic choice is provided, the specifications of the model especially
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allow us to apply its implications to the decision to enter a market in Central
and Eastern Europe.
Most of the literature on foreign entry has focused on the first decision in
considering the choice of ownership type between licensing, a wholly owned
subsidiary, and a joint venture. These modes of entry differ considerably in
their level of control, resource commitment, and risk. Anderson and Gatignon
[1986], for example, analyze the tradeoff between control and the cost of
resource commitment in a transaction cost framework. They argue that a
greater level of control is more efficient for highly transaction-specific assets.
Hill, Hwang and Kim [1990] present a wider approach which additionally
takes into account global strategies of the MNE and the risk of dissemination
of firm specific knowledge as factors influencing the control decision. Firms
will prefer high control entry modes if they persue global strategies or possess
a highly firm-specific know-how.
Relatively few studies have addressed the choice between greenfield in-
vestment and acquisition as modes of foreign entry. Empirically a variety
of potential factors influencing the choice of entry mode have been studied.
Kogut and Singh [1988], for example, study the influence of cultural distance
on the choice between greenfield investment, acquisition and joint venture.
The greater the cultural distance between the country of the investor and
the country of entry, the more likely a firm will choose a joint venture or a
greenfield investment over an acquisition. Other work considers additional
firm-specific factors like international experience, firm size or R&D. Caves
and Mehra [1986] find evidence for investment in the US that large and di-
versified companies prefer acquisition. Besides that acquisition is favored
for entry into rapidly growing or very slow growing markets. Hennart and
Park [1993] show that greenfield investment is the preferred mode of entry
for R&D intensive Japanese firms entering into the US.
Focusing on the specific conditions in transition economies Estrin, Hughes
and Todd [1997] and Meyer [1998] empirically analyze the choices of owner-
ship form and mode of entry into CEE. Estrin et al. [1997] find that most
of the MNEs in their sample aimed to achieve 100 per cent ownership even
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if initially, e.g. for political reasons, not possible. Meyer [1998] tests a num-
ber of hypotheses for CEE entry, which are based on previous work in the
international business literature. Surprisingly, he finds that entry into fast-
growing industries takes place via wholly owned greenfield investments, but
not via acquisition. This is in contrast to the well known argument that a
speedy entry, which is assumed important in fast-growing industries, can be
achieved by acquisition and not via greenfield investment. It also contrasts
the empirical findings by Caves and Mehra [1986] for US entry. Therefore, it
suggests that industrial growth in transition economies creates specific con-
ditions for competition that are different from other markets. The study also
shows that greenfield investments are the most common mode of entry into
CEE, accounting for more than 50 per cent of all projects in the sample. This
is particularly surprising in the light of a worldwide trend towards acquisition
and it underlines the need for a theoretical analysis.1
While some empirical work on the determinants of entry has been done,
apart from Buckley and Casson [1998], there is no comprehensive theoretical
model. In their study the choice between a variety of alternative entry modes
is analyzed. One important conclusion is that the market structure as well as
the strength of competition in the market each have a crucial impact on the
entry decision. Entry through greenfield investment contributes to the local
capacity and intensifies competition, while acquisition entry does not. The
existence of a high cost of competition associated with high monopoly rents
makes acquisition favorable over greenfield investment. A highly specific
production technology of the entrant resulting in higher adaptation costs, on
the other hand, discourages acquisition and favors greenfield investment.
Go¨rg [2000] builds on their approach in analyzing the effect of market
structure on the choice between greenfield investment and acquisition in a
Cournot-type setting. He shows that in general acquisition may be the pre-
ferred mode of entry, while only with a high cost of adaptation greenfield
investment may be an optimal choice.
1Mergers and acquisitions constitute an important mode of entry and their importance
has increased over time (UNCTAD [2000]).
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While Buckley and Casson [1998] determine market structure and strength
of competition as important factors, they are not able to specify exactly how
these factors affect the entry mode decision. In contrast to their approach
the present model does so. We study the choice of entry mode of a MNE be-
tween setting up a new venture via greenfield investment or acquisition of the
single local competitor. A greenfield investment enables the MNE to specify
the subsidiary according to its technological capabilities, while acquisition
allows at first only to use the given facilities. In the model presented below
this fact is reflected in that the MNE possesses a superior technology, but
can only make use of it when entering via greenfield. In case of acquisition
it is restricted to the acquired firm’s technological capabilities. After the
acquisition of the only competitor the MNE can act as a monopolist, while
greenfield investment in general leads to a competitive situation. In addition
to the endogenous effect of the market structure associated with the entry
mode, the influence of an exogenous change in the competition intensity on
the entry decision is analyzed. Contrasting Buckley and Casson [1998] or
Go¨rg [2000], we derive the acquisition price for an existing domestic firm as
well as the profits for the alternative entry modes endogenously. These values
obviously depend on the market structure, the competition intensity in the
market and differentials in the production cost of the competing firms.
The effects of the different exogenous variables defined in the model on
the entry decision are analyzed in detail. Increasing the investment cost
of greenfield entry obviously makes acquisition more attractive. We show
that this effect only holds up to a certain amount. If it gets too large,
however, acquisition becomes unattractive and no entry will be an optimal
choice. A higher technological backwardness of the domestic firm leads to
a higher profit for the MNE in competition, a lower acquisition price and
a lower monopoly profit for acquisition entry. Whether or not one of these
effects dominates is a priori not clear. But we can show that greenfield
investment is the optimal mode of entry only if the technological gap between
the competitors is sufficiently large. Surprisingly, we furthermore find that
the competition intensity within a market can influence the choice of entry
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mode in a non-monotonic fashion. When the market is very much or very
little competitive, greenfield investment is the optimal entry mode, while for
intermediate values it is acquisition.
With respect to the unusual empirical observations of entry mode deci-
sions into countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the results presented in
the model have some explanatory power. As the analysis shows greenfield
investment is the optimal mode of entry only if the technological gap between
the domestic firm and the MNE is sufficiently large. This is certainly the case
in many markets in CEE, which might explain why entry into these countries
foremost takes place via greenfield investment - in opposition to the world-
wide trend. Moreover, it is observed that entry into fast-growing industries
surprisingly takes place via greenfield investment, but not via acquisition.
Since one can associate fast-growing industries with less intense competition
the model exactly predicts that greenfield investment is the optimal mode of
entry in this situation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets up
the model. Section 2.3 considers the decision between greenfield investment
and acquisition and presents the main results. Section 2.4 discusses some of
the empirical observations and concludes.
2.2 The Model
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework to analyze the choice
of entry mode for a multinational enterprise entering into a foreign country.
Therefore, the focus is on the second decision a MNE faces, while 100 per cent
ownership is assumed to be the desired level of control. We consider a model
of horizontal product differentiation a` la Hotelling [1929] with firms compet-
ing in prices.2 Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed along the
unit interval [0,1] with density 1. Thus, the total number of consumers is
equal to 1.
2However, in contrast to the basic Hotelling model, we introduce cost asymmetry among
firms.
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The model consists of two periods. In period 1, the domestic firm 1
located at x = 0 serves (at least part of) the market. The foreign firm 2
considers whether or not to enter the market and, in case of entry, which
entry mode to employ. The market is assumed to be stable in the sense that
firm 1 cannot adopt a different production technology or set up a new venture
and there is no other potential entrant besides firm 2. To enter the market
firm 2 can either acquire firm 1 at location x = 0 or set up a new venture
at x = 1 through a greenfield investment. In period 2, firms simultaneously
compete in prices if firm 2 entered via greenfield investment. Otherwise firm
2 will employ its monopoly pricing strategy.
Firm i = 1, 2 produces with constant marginal cost ci. Production takes
place without any fixed cost. The entering MNE employs a superior tech-
nology than the domestic firm (c1 > c2 ≥ 0). Without this assumption the
results would be trivial as will become clear in what follows. But besides that,
it nicely fits the common observation that domestic firms in CEE possess less
efficient technologies compared to MNEs. When entering by acquisition it is
assumed that the entrant can only make use of the acquired firm’s technology
c1.
3 On the other hand, when setting up a new venture, firm 2 can obviously
implement its own technology c2.
Entry is viable if the entrant can earn a post-entry profit at least covering
the cost of entry. Foreign market entry requires a substantial investment
into physical capital, marketing etc., especially a greenfield entry. The cost
of entry via greenfield investment is denoted by k ≥ 0. The entry cost in
case of acquisition is equal to the acquisition price because of the assumption
that the entrant uses technology c1 and does not bear any adaptation cost
or restructuring cost. The acquisition price, denoted by PA, is determined
endogenously. To keep things simple it is assumed the entrant can make a
3It could also be assumed that the entrant can implement its own technology at a certain
adaptation cost. This would not alter the results but make the model more complicated
by adding extra variables. In our model, firm 2 bears some kind of adaptation cost caused
by the fact that only the inferior technology can be used which in turn yields lower profits
than employing the superior technology.
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take-it-or-leave-it-offer to acquire firm 1.4
The time structure of the entry game in period 1 is the following.
At stage 1, firm 2 (MNE) can choose between making a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to acquire firm 1, greenfield investment or no market entry.
At stage 2, if firm 2 has made an offer, the incumbent firm 1 can accept or
reject the offer.
At stage 3, firm 2 can again choose between greenfield investment or no entry
in case firm 1 has turned the offer down.
At stage 4, firms compete in prices and profits are realized.
We look for a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game just
described and therefore solve by backwards induction. If the entrant can
credibly commit to greenfield entry if its offer is rejected, then the acquisition
price PA will clearly be equal to firm 1’s post-greenfield profit. The entrant
can only credibly commit to a greenfield entry if this yields a non-negative
net profit. To put it in other words, k must not be too large. Otherwise the
entrant cannot commit to greenfield entry. Thus, the acquisition price will
be equal to firm 1’s monopoly profit in this case.
Consumers incur a linear transportation cost t if they buy the good from
one of the firms. The higher the transportation cost, the more differentiated
are the goods and the less intense is the price competition. The parameter t
can be interpreted as a measure of competition intensity in the market. The
larger the value of t, the less intense is the competition and vice versa. If
t = 0 we essentially have Bertrand competition. Each consumer wants to
buy exactly one unit of the good in every period if its price is not too high.
4The acquisition price obviously depends on the bargaining power of the entrant and
the incumbent. Other bargaining solutions, where the domestic firm has some bargaining
power, would lead to a higher acquisition price and therefore shift preferences of the
MNE in favor of greenfield investment. The other extreme case would be a situation,
as argued by Grossman and Hart [1980], where shareholders would not tender their share
below the post acquisition value of the firm. Thus, the free rider problem would render the
acquisition infeasible unless the acquiring firm initially holds some of the shares. Assuming
full bargaining power of the entrant instead, at least constitutes a lower bound for the
acquisition price.
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Consumers’ surplus from consumption is denoted by s. Let pi denote the
price charged by firm i = 1, 2. Hence, in case of a greenfield investment the
net utility of a consumer located at x is
U =

s− xt− p1 if good is bought from firm 1,
s− (1− x)t− p2 if good is bought from firm 2,
0 if good is not bought.
In case of acquisition the net utility of a consumer located at x becomes
U =
 s− xt− p2 if good is bought from firm 2,0 if good is not bought.
Two additional assumptions are made concerning the consumers’ surplus:
1. The consumers’ surplus is sufficiently large such that firm 2 would like
to serve the entire market when using its own technology: s ≥ c2 + 2t.
2. For c1 ≥ s, firm 1 is not in the market from the beginning.
The first assumption excludes cases that are characterized by very weak
competition intensity. Since we would like to analyze the effect of competition
intensity these situations are of little interest.5 The second assumption is on
the one hand very intuitive in that a firm operating with a loss for certain
will not be in the market.6 On the other hand, it enriches the analysis by
considering the observation that the entry decision is also restricted by a
limited supply of potential acquisition targets. In this situation the entrant
can only choose to enter the market through greenfield investment or not to
enter the market at all.
5However, as will become clear shortly, for very weak competition intensity either
greenfield investment or no entry is the optimal choice.
6In the case of state-owned firms, especially for CEE countries, it could be argued that
a firm would even be in the market when making a loss for sure and the state had carried
this loss. Within the assumptions of this model the entrant would never acquire such a
firm. In a post-greenfield situation this firm would no longer be in the market unless the
state would bear an even higher loss. This scenario is not part of our analysis.
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As argued before, entry is viable if the post-entry profit at least covers the
cost of entry. Acquisition is a better alternative than greenfield investment
if the net post-entry profit of the former is higher than of the latter entry
mode. In what follows we consider the effects of the models parameters on
the optimal entry mode decision. The profits for the alternative entry modes
and the optimal decision are determined in the Appendix.
2.3 Greenfield Investment versus Acquisition
What are the driving forces determining the optimal entry mode decision?
All of the model’s parameters enter into the decision function. In principle,
there are three crucial values that are essential for the decision. These values
are the acquisition price, the monopoly profit in case of acquisition, and the
net greenfield profit. As will be seen below, there are some fairly obvious
results concerning the impact of certain parameters on these values, while
others enter into the decision in a non-trivial fashion.
We now look at the different exogenous variables that affect the choice of
greenfield investment versus acquisition in turn. We start with considering
the investment cost k. The investment cost is crucial for the determina-
tion of the acquisition price and therefore the achievable profit under both
alternative entry modes. It is straightforward to see that, as k increases, ac-
quisition becomes relatively more attractive. Surprisingly, however, if k gets
too large, acquisition becomes unattractive and the entrant prefers not to
enter the market at all. What is the reason for this counterintuitive result?
The greenfield profit piG2 is strictly decreasing in k. Note that for a certain
investment cost k = k¯ this profit becomes equal to zero. Thus, for k ≥ k¯
greenfield investment is no longer viable. This results in an acquisition price
equal to firm 1’s monopoly profit. Therefore, acquisition has no advantage
over no entry and the entrant chooses not to enter at all. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.7
7See also Figure 2.1 in the Appendix which highlights the optimal decision for certain
parameter values. The dotted line in the bottom area displays k¯.
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Proposition 2.1 There exists a k¯(s, c1, c2, t), such that for k < k¯ an in-
crease in k makes acquisition more attractive relative to greenfield invest-
ment. For k ≥ k¯ the entrant prefers not to enter at all.
This result is surprising on first sight since it states that acquisition only is
an option for market entry if a greenfield entry is also profitable. In other
words market entry will be an optimal decision only if greenfield investment
would be viable.8
How does the technology parameter c1 affect the optimal mode of entry?
Since the entrant can, in case of acquisition, only make use of the inferior
technology c1, this production cost directly influences all crucial values. This
means c1 has an effect on the acquisition price PA, the monopoly profit in
case of acquisition piM1 and the greenfield profit pi
G
2 .
9 A priori one might
expect, that an increase in c1 makes greenfield investment relatively more
attractive compared to acquisition since the monopoly profit decreases, while
the greenfield profit increases. On the other hand, the acquisition price also
decreases in c1.
Lemma 2.1 Increasing c1 has a strictly positive effect on the greenfield profit
piG2 , a non-positive effect on the acquisition price PA, and a strictly negative
effect on the monopoly profit piM1 :
dpiG2
dc1
> 0;
dPA
dc1
≤ 0; dpi
M
1
dc1
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The positive effect on the greenfield profit is very intuitive since increasing
the production cost for the incumbent leads to an improved position for the
entrant in competition. Also there is certainly a non-positive effect on the
acquisition price as well as a negative one on the monopoly profit. From
the point of view of the entrant, a more inferior competitive position of the
8See the Appendix for an exact determination of k¯ in the different parameter cases.
9The subscript 1 for the monopoly profit in case of acquisition indicates that technology
c1 is used.
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incumbent makes greenfield investment more attractive. On the other hand,
acquisition gets cheaper since the acquisition price (weakly) decreases, but
at the same time the gross profit in case of acquisition piM1 strictly decreases.
A priori it is not clear if (and which) one of the effects on the crucial values
dominates. However, there is an unambiguous tendency, as the following
lemma states.
Lemma 2.2 The effect of an increase in c1 on the monopoly profit pi
M
1
(weakly) dominates the effect on the acquisition price PA and therefore the
net acquisition profit piA2 (weakly) decreases in c1:∣∣∣∣∣dpiM1dc1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣dPAdc1
∣∣∣∣∣⇔ dpiA2dc1 ≤ 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The effect on the acquisition price PA is equal to the effect on the gross profit
piM1 only in Case 3 (b), since then both values are equal. In all other cases
the latter effect strictly dominates the former. Therefore, except for the case
in which acquisition and no entry yield the same profit, the acquisition profit
strictly decreases in c1. Given these results the following proposition can be
claimed.10
Proposition 2.2 For k < k¯ there exists a c¯1(s, c2, t, k), such that
(a) for c1 ≤ c¯1 acquisition is the optimal mode of entry and
(b) for c1 > c¯1 greenfield investment is the optimal mode of entry.
Proof: See Appendix.
For very similar technologies (c1 ≤ c¯1) it is obvious that acquisition is always
favorable over a greenfield investment, since then greenfield investment leads
to a relatively low profit for the entrant, while the achievable monopoly
profit using technology c1 is high. When increasing c1 for a given c2, and
10See Figure 2.1 in the Appendix for an illustration of the result.
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therefore increasing the technology difference, Lemma 2.2 applies. Thus, for
sufficiently different technologies, greenfield investment is the optimal mode
of entry. At the same time the investment cost k should not be too large,
since it directly reduces the net profit for greenfield entry.
Next, we consider the effect of the consumers’ surplus s on the decision of
entry mode. This variable naturally has an impact on the profits that can be
achieved. Obviously, the monopoly profit should increase in the value of s.
On the other hand, one could expect the greenfield profit and the acquisition
price to react in the same manner. However, as the following lemma shows
this is not the case in general.
Lemma 2.3 Increasing s results in
(i) a strictly positive effect on the monopoly profit piM1 and a (weakly) pos-
itive effect on the acquisition profit piA2 ,
dpiM1
ds
> 0;
dpiA2
ds
≥ 0,
(ii) no effect on the greenfield profit piG2 or the acquisition price PA for
s ≥ 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t),
dpiG2
ds
= 0;
dPA
ds
= 0,
but strictly positive effects for s < 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t),
dpiG2
ds
> 0;
dPA
ds
> 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The following proposition describes the effect of an increase in s on the
decision of entry mode.11
Proposition 2.3 For k < k¯ there exists a finite s¯(c1, c2, t, k), such that ac-
quisition is the optimal mode of entry for all s ≥ s¯.
Proof: See Appendix.
11Figure 2.2 in the Appendix highlights the results claimed in the following three propo-
sitions for certain parameter values.
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The intuition behind this result is fairly simple. The higher the gross benefit
for the consumers, the higher the monopoly profit becomes. On the other
hand, above a certain value of s the greenfield profit as well as the acquisition
price are no longer affected by an increase in s, since these values become
independent of s.12 Thus, there exists a value s¯(c1, c2, t, k) above which
acquisition will be strictly better than greenfield investment. But this result
is only valid as long as a greenfield investment would be viable as well, i.e.
k < k¯.
The result presented in Proposition 2.3 is surprising since it claims that
the entry mode decision depends on the consumers’ surplus in an unexpected
way. In particular, it implies that for two products, differing only with re-
spect to consumers’ gross benefit, in the market for one good greenfield in-
vestment might be the optimal choice, while in the other one it is acquisition.
Moreover, if consumers in different regions associate the same product with
different valuations, the same effect on the entry decision could apply.
How does the optimal entry mode decision change with a change in the
competition intensity t? Obviously, the effect of an increase in t on the
monopoly profit is always negative. The effects on the other crucial val-
ues, however, are not as clearcut. In particular, for increasing t (decreasing
competition intensity) the effect on the acquisition price is inverse U-shaped,
while the effect on the greenfield profit and the acquisition profit is U-shaped.
A priori it is not clear how these opposing effects influence the optimal entry
mode choice. As one result of this we can show that under certain conditions
there is a non-monotonic relation between the competition intensity param-
eter t and the entry decision. When considering the effect of the competition
intensity again the consumers’ surplus plays an important role. Two interest-
ing results follow for different levels of consumers’ benefit. We first consider
a situation with a relatively high value of consumers’ surplus (s ≥ sˆ) and
sufficiently low investment cost (k ≤ kˆ). A formal definition of sˆ and kˆ is
given in the Appendix.
12As claimed in Lemma 2.3. The reason for this is the equilibrium in price strategies
which is independent of s in Case 1 and Case 2.
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Proposition 2.4 For s ≥ sˆ and k ≤ kˆ there exists a t¯(s, c1, c2, k), such that
(a) for t ≤ t¯ acquisition is the optimal mode of entry and
(b) for t > t¯ greenfield investment is the optimal mode of entry.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result claims that for a sufficiently high consumers’ gross benefit s and
investment cost k not too high the optimal mode of entry is acquisition for
higher competition intensities, while it is greenfield investment for low compe-
tition intensity. Thus, there exists a certain cutoff value for t that determines
whether one or the other entry mode constitutes an optimal choice. The first
part of the result is related to Proposition 2.3, which stated that there exists
a value s¯ such that acquisition is the optimal mode of entry for all s ≥ s¯.
We can find a value sˆ ≥ s¯ for high competition intensity. Decreasing the
competition intensity (increasing t) for the very same value of sˆ results in
a negative effect on the net acquisition profit and a positive effect on the
greenfield profit. The reason for the former effect is that a lower competition
intensity results in a higher acquisition price and at the same time a lower
monopoly profit. The latter effect is due to the fact that lower competi-
tion intensity results in higher profits. Further decreasing the competition
intensity eventually leads to greenfield investment as the optimal choice.
The result suggests that for two different markets that are only distin-
guished by different levels of competition intensity, in one market acquisition
might be the optimal choice, while it is greenfield investment in the other.
This provides another possible explanation as for why entry modes should
differ for entry into different markets.
Now we come to the second result concerning the effect of the competition
intensity for lower values of s. The following proposition shows that the
competition intensity, surprisingly, has a non-monotonic impact on the entry
mode decision.
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Proposition 2.5 For s ∈ (s, s˜) and k ∈ (1
3
(c1 − c2), 35(c1 − c2)] there exist
t(s, c1, c2, k) and t˜(s, c1, c2, k), such that the optimal entry mode is
(a) greenfield investment for very intense competition, t ≤ t,
(b) acquisition for intermediate competition intensities, t ∈ (t, t˜), and
(c) greenfield investment for low competition intensity, t ≥ t˜,
where s = c1 + 2
√
1
3
(c1 − c2)(23(c1 − c2)− k) and s˜ = 2c1 − c2 − k.
Proof: See Appendix.
The proposition shows that under certain conditions the competition inten-
sity affects the optimal entry mode decision in a non-monotonic fashion.13
Greenfield investment is the preferred mode of entry, when the market is very
much or very little competitive. For intermediate values acquisition is the
optimal entry mode. To understand the intuition for this interesting result
we will consider the effects of competition on the three crucial values, i.e. the
acquisition price, the monopoly profit, and the greenfield profit.
If competition is very fierce, the acquisition price is equal to zero and at
the same time the greenfield profit is large. The reason for this is that by
greenfield investment the MNE is able to force the incumbent firm out of the
market because of the technological advantage it possesses. The monopoly
profit is comparably low because of the assumed low consumer surplus and
the restriction to the inferior technology. Therefore, greenfield investment
is the optimal entry mode even though acquisition comes at a price of zero.
For intermediate values the acquisition price is still very small. But the
greenfield profit becomes much smaller since with less intense competition
the MNE can no longer force the incumbent out of the market. The monopoly
profit remains almost the same. Thus, acquisition becomes the optimal mode
of entry. When the market is very little competitive, greenfield investment
13For k > 35 (c1 − c2) there can even exist - at least for some s within the interval -
a tˆ(s, c1, c2, k) such that for t ∈ (t˜, tˆ) greenfield investment is the optimal choice and for
t ≥ tˆ it is no entry.
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again becomes the optimal entry mode. The reason for this is that the firms
achieve more power over their consumers and therefore larger profits. As a
consequence the acquisition price as well as the greenfield profit increase.
To summarize the described effects of competition for low consumers’
surplus, we can argue that it is more important to use the superior technology
than to become a monopolist when the market is very little or very much
competitive and vice versa for intermediate values.
2.4 Discussion and Conclusions
Although highly stylized the model presented above gives some useful new
insights into the determinants that affect the strategic choice of entry mode.
Our contribution to the literature on foreign entry is to establish a theoretical
framework that allows an in-depth analysis of the impact of various exogenous
factors in a simple setting. In particular, we are able to specify exactly how
the market structure and the competition intensity in a market influence
the entry decision. Even though previous work already identified both as
important factors, it was not able to characterize their exact impact. While
our analysis does so, it moreover shows that the influence of these factors is
not as straightforward as the literature suggests.
In principle, there exist three crucial values that determine the optimal
entry choice: The acquisition price, the monopoly profit when using the
inferior technology, and the net greenfield profit. We examined the different
exogenous variables specified in the model that affect these values.
First, we considered the cost associated with greenfield entry. Intuitively,
it could be argued that increasing this cost leads to acquisition becoming
more attractive. We showed that an increasing investment cost has this effect
only up to a certain point. If the cost gets too large, however, acquisition
becomes unattractive and the entrant prefers not to enter the market at all.
Second, for the technology parameter of the domestic competitor, the
effect on the entry decision was a priori not clear since it has opposite effects
on the three crucial values already mentioned. An increase in the production
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cost of the domestic firm has a positive effect on the entrant’s greenfield
profit, but negative effects on the monopoly profit and the acquisition price.
Nevertheless, we could show that the effect on the monopoly profit dominates
the effect on the acquisition price. Therefore, greenfield investment becomes
the optimal mode of entry if the difference in technological capabilities is
sufficiently large.
Third, the gross benefit for the consumers definitely has an impact on
the decision since it determines how much rents can be extracted from them.
The higher this benefit, the higher should become the achievable profits un-
der both entry modes. We showed that for a given constellation of the other
variables there exists a finite value for consumers’ surplus such that acquisi-
tion is the optimal mode of entry for all higher values. The reason for this
result is that the greenfield profit increases in the consumers benefit only up
to a certain point, but beyond it remains the same. As soon as it comes
to a situation where both firms cannot act as local monopolists their profits
in competition remain the same for all higher values of consumers’ surplus.
The result implies that for two different product markets that are only dis-
tinguished by different levels of consumers’ surplus, it might well be the case
that in one market greenfield investment is the optimal mode, while in the
other one it is acquisition. This implication can help to explain why MNEs in
some markets employ the greenfield entry strategy and in others acquisition
entry, while in either both opportunities are present.
Fourth, the competition intensity in a market was characterized as one
of the most important factors concerning the choice of entry mode. There
are two situations to be distinguished, depending on consumers’ surplus.
For a sufficiently high consumers’ surplus we found that high competition
intensity leads to acquisition as the optimal mode of entry, but it is green-
field investment for low levels of competition. The reason for this result is
that the acquisition price and the greenfield profit increase with decreasing
competition, while the monopoly profit decreases. Less intensive competition
results in a reduced incentive to become a monopolist, while the technological
advantage becomes more important. More surprisingly, however, we found
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that the optimal mode of entry depends on the competition intensity in a
non-monotonic fashion when consumers’ surplus is relatively low. Greenfield
investment is the optimal mode of entry when the market is very much or
very little competitive, while it is acquisition for intermediate values. This
is caused by the fact that for lower consumers’ surplus it becomes more im-
portant to use the superior technology when the market is very much or very
little competitive, while it becomes more important to be a monopolist in
the intermediate case.
The presented general analysis sheds some light on the empirical evidence
on the choice of foreign entry mode that has been provided recently. In
particular, we can give some explanation for the on first sight counterintuitive
observations for entry into countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The
empirical evidence suggests that these countries are characterized by specific
conditions for competition that differ from other markets.
Greenfield investment is the most common mode of entry into CEE as
Meyer [1998] derives from his data set. This is a surprising fact since there is
a recent trend towards acquisition worldwide. One possible explanation could
be that CEE countries lack potential acquisition targets for those industries
where greenfield investment took place. We provided other explanations in
the present chapter. We showed that greenfield investment is an optimal
choice if the local competitor possesses an inferior technology. Since it is
a common fact that firms in CEE do not have access to state of the art
technology, our model gives a nice explanation for the observed situation.
Moreover, our results characterize the exact market conditions under which
greenfield investment is the optimal mode of entry.
Entry into fast-growing industries in CEE, surprisingly, takes place via
greenfield investment, but not via acquisition. Intuitively, it should be argued
that, since the speed of entry is important in industries that are fast-growing,
acquisition should be preferred. Acquisition certainly provides a faster entry
and access to a market than greenfield investment. Again, it could be ar-
gued that the technological backwardness of domestic firms is the reason for
the counterintuitive behavior. Meyer [1998] suggests as possible explanations
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that either the investment itself is the cause for the growth in the industry,
or growing industries can accommodate more entrants without frictions be-
tween competitors, or the highest growth occurred in until then neglected
industries. We showed that greenfield investment is an optimal choice if
the competition intensity is low. Since for fast-growing industries it is rea-
sonable to assume a low competition intensity, this provides an alternative
explanation for the empirical observation.
A possible extension of the model could be to include the entry decision of
more than one MNE, either simultaneously or sequentially. Despite this we
feel confident that the assumptions and conclusions of our model are relevant
for the entry mode decision and leave other considerations for future research.
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Appendix
A) The equilibria in price strategies
In order to compute the profits for the alternative entry modes, the equilibria
in price strategies have to be defined for the different situations. When firm 2
enters via acquisition it will afterwards employ its monopoly pricing strategy
using technology c1. That is p
M
2 = s−t for s ≥ c1+2t or pM2 = s+c12 otherwise.
In case of greenfield investment the equilibrium price strategies are:
• For c1 ≥ s firm 1 is not in the market and thus firm 2 chooses pM2 = s−t.
• Case 1: p1 = c1, p2 = c1 − t.
• Case 2: p1 = 2c1+c2+3t3 , p2 = 2c2+c1+3t3 .
• Case 3: (a) p1 = s− c2−c1+3t6 , p2 = s− c1−c2+3t6 .
(b) pM1 =
s+c1
2
, p2 =
3s−2t−c1
2
.
The first two cases display the common equilibrium price strategies in a
model of horizontal product differentiation. In Case 1 firm 2 can force the
incumbent out of the market and then faces all demand. In Case 2 there
exists a consumer with location x˜ who is indifferent between buying from
firm 1 or firm 2. In Case 3 things get a bit more complicated. The reason
for this is the assumed situation with constant but asymmetric marginal cost
for the two parties and the assumption that firm 2 would in principle like to
serve the whole market when using its own technology c2. On the other hand,
there is no restriction on the technological capabilities of firm 1 and therefore
Case 3 emerges as a possible situation. The distinction between Case 3 (a)
and (b) is that in the former firm 1’s monopoly supply is greater than x˜
and in the latter it is smaller. The defined equilibria are not unique, since
there exists a continuum of equilibria in an -environment close to them. Its
range depends on the exact constellation of parameters. However, the price
strategy combinations considered here always constitute an equilibrium for
each case. Furthermore, it easily can be shown that the pricing strategies for
case (a) cannot be an equilibrium for case (b).
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B) Profits for the alternative entry modes
If firm 2 chooses to enter via greenfield investment its profit is determined
by the outcome of competition with the domestic firm net of the investment
cost k. On the other hand, if the firm enters via acquisition the profit is
determined by the monopoly profit when using the inferior technology c1 net
of the acquisition price PA. As argued before this acquisition price depends
on the ability of firm 2 to commit to greenfield entry in case its take-it-
or-leave-it offer is turned down. If the firm can commit to greenfield entry
the acquisition price is equal to firm 1’s post greenfield value - the profit
that can be achieved in competition with the MNE. Otherwise if the MNE
cannot commit to greenfield entry the acquisition price is equal to firm 1’s
monopoly profit. The results derived for acquisition entry assume that firm
2 can commit to greenfield entry. Otherwise firm 2 prefers not to enter.
1. Greenfield investment
For c1 ≥ s firm 1 is not in the market. Thus, firm 2’s profit becomes
piG2 = s− t− c2 − k.
Next, the situation is considered where firm 1 is in the market, that is s > c1.
At this point three case have to be distinguished: 1. If the price difference
between the two firms exceeds t along the whole interval, one firm has no
demand. 2. Otherwise both firms face a demand if s is sufficiently large, such
that all consumers want to buy one unit of the good. 3. Both firms possess
local monopoly power if s is too small.
Case 1: Within the assumptions of this model there is only one case to be
considered, namely firm 2 facing all demand, p1−p2 > t.14 The firms’ profits
are
piG1 = 0,
piG2 = c1 − c2 − t− k.
14After inserting the equilibrium price strategies for Case 2 it follows that p1 − p2 >
t⇔ t < c1−c23 .
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Case 2: The price difference between the two firms does not exceed t, that
is p1 − p2 ≤ t, and s is sufficiently large.15 Thus, the firms profits are
piG1 =
(c2−c1+3t)2
18t
,
piG2 =
(c1−c2+3t)2
18t
− k.
The consumers’ surplus s is sufficiently large if s ≥ 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t). Thus,
there exists a consumer with location x˜ who is indifferent between buying
from firm 1 and buying from firm 2.16
Case 3: For s < 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t) the consumer with location x˜, who would
have been indifferent between the two firms, would not buy if the firms were
to choose the competitive prices. Thus, both firms possess local monopoly
power. Depending on consumers’ surplus two more cases have to be distin-
guished: (a) The pricing strategies constitute an equilibrium such that the
consumer located at x˜ is indifferent between the firms and between buying
or not. (b) Firm 1 sets the monopoly price and firm 2 sets a price such
that there exists a consumer who is indifferent from which firm to buy and
whether or not to buy at all.
(a) For s > 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) firms’ profits are
piG1 = (
6s−5c1−c2−3t
6
)( c2−c1+3t
6t
),
piG2 = (
6s−c1−5c2−3t
6
)( c1−c2+3t
6t
)− k.
(b) For 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) ≥ s firms profits’ are
piG1 =
(s−c1)2
4t
,
piG2 = (
3s−c1−2c2−2t
2
)(2t+c1−s
2t
)− k.
15After inserting the equilibrium prices it follows that p1 − p2 ≤ t⇔ t ≥ c1−c23 .
16Where x˜ = p2−p1+t2t =
c2−c1+3t
6t .
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2. Acquisition
For c1 ≥ s acquisition is not feasible since by assumption there exists no
target firm. For s > c1 the same three cases as above have to be considered.
To calculate firm 2’s net profit, its monopoly pricing strategy also has to be
taken into account. For s ≥ c1 + 2t the monopolist would like to serve the
whole market and otherwise only a part of it.
Case 1: For t < c1−c2
3
the acquisition price PA will be zero.
1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t firm 2’s profit is
piA2 = s− t− c1.
2. For s < c1 + 2t the profit is
piA2 =
(s−c1)2
4t
.
Case 2: For t ≥ c1−c2
3
and s being sufficiently large, that is s ≥ 1
2
(c1+c2+3t),
the acquisition price will be PA =
(c2−c1+3t)2
18t
.
1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t the net profit of firm 2 is
piA2 = s− t− c1 − (c2−c1+3t)
2
18t
.
2. For s < c1 + 2t the net profit is
piA2 =
(s−c1)2
4t
− (c2−c1+3t)2
18t
.
Case 3: If s is too small the acquisition price becomes in case (a) PA =
(6s−5c1−c2−3t
6
)( c2−c1+3t
6t
) and in case (b) PA =
(s−c1)2
4t
. Thus, the net profits for
firm 2 in these cases are 17
(a) piA2 =
(3s−2c1−c2−3t)2
36t
,
(b) piA2 = 0.
17If s is too small it follows that s < 12 (c1 + c2 + 3t) < c1 + 2t. Thus, firm 2 will always
only serve part of the market using technology c1.
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C) The optimal entry mode
The superiority of one entry mode over the other will be written as an in-
equality with consumers’ surplus s on the left-hand side. In the borderline
case when greenfield investment and acquisition yield the same net post-entry
payoff, i.e. the constraint is fulfilled with equality, it is simply assumed that
acquisition will be chosen.
For c1 ≥ s only greenfield investment is feasible. The entrant will choose this
entry mode only if this is viable:
piG2 = s− t− c2 − k > 0.
Thus, for
s > c2 + t+ k (2.1)
firm 2 will choose greenfield investment and otherwise it will not enter the
market at all.
If firm 1 is initially in the market, i.e. s > c1, acquisition will be chosen
whenever piA2 ≥ piG2 . Solving for s and re-arranging gives a critical value s¯ for
each situation:18
Case 1: When firm 1 faces no demand in competition with firm 2, i.e. t <
c1−c2
3
, greenfield investment is viable if k < k¯ = c1 − c2 − t.
1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t acquisition is the preferred mode of entry if
s ≥ s¯ = 2c1 − c2 − k (2.2)
and otherwise it is greenfield investment.
2. For s < c1 + 2t acquisition is preferable if
s ≥ s¯ = c1 + 2
√
t(c1 − c2 − t− k) (2.3)
or greenfield investment in the opposite case.
18These values are well defined as long as k < k¯ in the respective case.
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Case 2: For t ≥ c1−c2
3
greenfield investment is viable whenever k < k¯ =
(c1−c2+3t)2
18t
.
1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t acquisition is the preferred mode of entry if
s ≥ s¯ = (c1 − c2)
2
9t
+ 2t+ c1 − k (2.4)
and greenfield otherwise.
2. For s < c1 + 2t acquisition is preferable if
s ≥ s¯ = c1 + 2
√
1
9
(c1 − c2)2 + t2 − tk (2.5)
or greenfield investment else.
Case 3: If s is too small, s < 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t), greenfield investment is vi-
able in case (a) if k < k¯ = (6s−c1−5c2−3t
6
)( c1−c2+3t
6t
) or in case (b) k < k¯ =
(3s−c1−2c2−2t
2
)(2t+c1−s
2t
).
(a) For s > 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) acquisition is the preferred mode if
s ≤ s¯ = c1 + 2t− 2
√
1
9
(c1 − c2)2 + 1
2
t(c1 − c2 + t)− tk (2.6)
and greenfield otherwise.
(b) For 1
3
(2c1+c2+3t) ≥ s acquisition leads to a zero net profit for certain.
If greenfield investment is not viable the MNE prefers not to enter at
all. Thus, no entry will be the preferred mode if
s ≤ s¯ = 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 4t−
√
(c1 − c2 + 2t)2 − 12tk) (2.7)
and otherwise greenfield entry is viable and will be chosen.
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D) Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1:
We have to show that
dpiG2
dc1
> 0, dPA
dc1
≤ 0, dpiM1
dc1
< 0 is fulfilled for all cases.
(i) Case 1:
dpiG2
dc1
= 1, dPA
dc1
= 0.
Case 2:
dpiG2
dc1
= c1−c2+3t
9t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= c1−c2−3t
9t
≤ 0, for t ≥ c1−c2
3
.
Case 3: (a)
dpiG2
dc1
= 3s−c1−2c2−3t
18t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= 5c1−2c2−6t−3s
18t
< 0, for
s > 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t).
(b)
dpiG2
dc1
= 2s−c1−c2−2t
2t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= − s−c1
2t
< 0, for s ≥ {c2+2t, c1}.
(ii) For s ≥ c1 + 2t we have dpi
M
1
dc1
= −1 and dpiM1dc1 = − s−c12t < 0 otherwise.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.2:
We have to show that
dpiA2
dc1
≤ 0 is fulfilled for all cases. Since dpiA2
dc1
=
dpiM1
dc1
− dPA
dc1
it follows from proof of Lemma 2.1 :
Case 1: For s ≥ c1 + 2t it is dpi
A
2
dc1
= −1 and dpiA2
dc1
= − s−c1
2t
< 0 otherwise.
Case 2: For s ≥ c1 + 2t it is dpi
A
2
dc1
= c2−c1−6t
9t
< 0 and
dpiA2
dc1
= 7c1+2c2+6t−9s
18t
< 0
otherwise.
Case 3: (a) For s ≥ 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) we have
dpiA2
dc1
= 2c1+c2+3t−3s
9t
< 0.
(b)
dpiA2
dc1
= 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
We have to show that for k < k¯ there exists a c¯1(s, c2, t, k) such that green-
field investment is the optimal mode of entry for c1 > c¯1 and acquisition
otherwise. Re-arranging equations (2.2) - (2.7) with s¯ = s determines the
crucial value c¯1:
Case 1: 1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t the crucial value is c¯1 = 12(s+ c2 + k).
2. For s < c1 + 2t the value is c¯1 = s+ 2t− 2
√
t(s− c2 − k).
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Case 2: 1. For s ≥ c1+2t the value is c¯1 = 12 [2c2−9t+3
√
t2 + 4t(s+ k − c2)].
2. For s < c1 + 2t it is c¯1 =
1
5
[9s− 4c2 − 6
√
(s− c2)2 + 5t(t− k)].
Case 3: (a) c¯1 =
1
5
[9s− 9t− 4c2 − 3
√
4(s− c2)2 + t(2s− t− 2c2 − 20k)].
(b) c¯1 = 2s− 2t− c2 −
√
(s− c2)2 − 4tk.
By proof of Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 we know that
dpiG2
dc1
> 0,
dpiA2
dc1
≤ 0.
Thus, it follows that for c1 > c¯1 greenfield is the optimal entry mode and
acquisition otherwise. In Case 3 (b) c1 > c¯1 is always fulfilled by assumption
k < k¯.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.3:
We have to show that
dpiM1
ds
> 0,
dpiA2
ds
≥ 0 for all cases, dpiG2
ds
> 0, dPA
ds
> 0 for
s < 1
2
(c1+c2+3t), and
dpiG2
ds
= dPA
ds
= 0 otherwise. Note that
dpiA2
ds
=
dpiM1
ds
− dPA
ds
.
(i) For s ≥ c1 + 2t we have dpi
M
1
ds
= 1 or
dpiM1
ds
= s−cs
2t
> 0 otherwise.
(ii) Case 1:
dpiG2
ds
= dPA
ds
= 0;
dpiA2
ds
= 1 or
dpiA2
ds
= s−cs
2t
.
Case 2:
dpiG2
ds
= dPA
ds
= 0;
dpiA2
ds
= 1 or
dpiA2
ds
= s−cs
2t
.
Case 3: (a)
dpiG2
ds
= c1−c2+3t
6t
, dPA
ds
= c2−c1+3t
6t
> 0;
dpiA2
ds
= 3s−2c1−c2−3t
6t
> 0.
(b)
dpiG2
ds
= 2c1+c2+4t−3s
2t
> 0; dPA
ds
= s−c1
2t
> 0;
dpiA2
ds
= 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
We have to show that a finite value for s¯(c1, c2, t, k) always exists when k < k¯.
Case 1: 1. For t ≤ 1
2
(c1 − c2 − k) the crucial value is s¯ = 2c1 − c2 − k.
2. For t > 1
2
(c1 − c2 − k) the value is s¯ = c1 + 2
√
t(c1 − c2 − t− k).
Case 2: 1. For t ≤ (c1−c2)2
9k
the value is s¯ = (c1−c2)
2
9t
+ 2t+ c1 − k.
2. For t > (c1−c2)
2
9k
the value is s¯ = c1 + 2
√
1
9
(c1 − c2)2 + t2 − tk.
Where equations (2.2) - (2.5) determine the values for s¯(c1, c2, t, k). We can
also determine s¯(c1, c2, t, k) in Case 3. But increasing s above s =
1
2
(c1+c2+
3t) always leads to the situation in Case 2, where as shown an s¯(c1, c2, t, k)
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exists whenever k < k¯. By proof of Lemma 2.3 we know that
dpiG2
ds
= 0 and
dpiA2
ds
> 0 in Case 1 and Case 2. Thus, it follows that for s ≥ s¯ acquisition
is the optimal entry mode. The intersection of the respective equation for s¯
with s = c1 + 2t or s =
1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t) determine the case distinctions.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
We have to show that t¯(c1, c2, s, k) exists for s ≥ sˆ and k ≤ kˆ. From proof of
Proposition 2.3 we know that for k < k¯ there exists an s¯ such that acquisition
is the optimal mode of entry. In Case 1 for s ≥ sˆ = 2c1 − c2 − k acquisition
is the optimal entry mode. It remains to show that there exists a t¯ in Case
2. Depending on the exact parameter constellations the crucial t¯ is either
t¯1 = max{c1 − c2
3
,
1
4
(s− c1 + 1
3
√
9(s− c1 − k)2 − 8(c1 − c2)2)}
or
t¯2 = max{c1 − c2
3
,
1
2
k +
1
6
√
9(s− c1)2 − 4(c1 − c2)2 + 9k2},
with t¯ = t¯1 for t¯1 ≤ 12(s − c1) and t¯ = t¯2 otherwise. Re-arranging (2.4)
respectively (2.5) yields the second part in each case.
The crucial t¯ exists for k ≤ kˆ = 18s(c1−c2)−9(c21−c22)+4(c1−c2)2
18(s−c2) and s ≥ sˆ =
max{2c1 − c2 − k, 2c2 − c1 + 2k + 13
√
19(c1 − c2)2 + 36k(c2 − c1 + k)}. The
intersection of s = c2+2t with (2.6) gives a maximum value for t. Substituting
the resulting t into s = c2 + 2t yields the second part of sˆ which ensures
that no entry never is an optimal decision in the considered situation. Re-
arranging t¯2 =
1
2
k+ 1
6
√
9(s− c1)2 − 4(c1 − c2)2 + 9k2 ≤ 12(s−c2) results in kˆ.
By construction of the parameter spaces greenfield investment is the optimal
mode of entry for t > t¯ and acquisition otherwise.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5:
We have to show that for s ∈ (s, s˜) and k ∈ (1
3
(c1− c2), 35(c1− c2)] there exist
t and t˜ with the described properties. Re-arranging (2.3) respectively (2.5)
yields
t =
1
2
(c1 − c2 − k −
√
(c1 − c2)2 − k(2c1 − 2c2 − k)− (s− c1)2),
t˜ =
1
2
k +
1
6
√
9(s− c1)2 − 4(c1 − c2)2 + 9k2.
It is easy to show, that t < c1−c2
3
< t˜ for s ∈ (s, s˜) and k ∈ (1
3
(c1− c2), 35(c1−
c2)]. The value for s is equal to equation (2.3) evaluated at t =
c1−c2
3
and s˜
is equal to sˆ in Case 1 as described in Proposition 2.4. For (s, s˜) not to be
empty it must be that k > c1−c2
3
. At the same time no entry should never
be an optimal choice in the considered situation. Therefore, k should be
small enough such that s ≥ 2c2−c1+2k+ 13
√
19(c1 − c2)2 + 36k(c2 − c1 + k)
is fulfilled. This value has already been determined in proof of Proposition
2.4. Re-arranging yields k ≤ ( 1
72
A − 84
9
1
A
+ 4
9
)(c1 − c2) with A = (11348 +
276
√
4641)
1
3 . Thus, the upper bound for k is approximately k˜ ≈ 3(c1−c2)
5
,
with k˜ < ( 1
72
A− 84
9
1
A
+ 4
9
)(c1 − c2).
Q.E.D.
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E) Illustration of the results
Figure 2.1: Optimal entry mode for s = 5, c2 = 1, t = 1.
Figure 2.2: Optimal entry mode for c1 = 4, c2 = 1, k = 1.75.
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Chapter 3
Modes of Foreign Entry under
Asymmetric Information about
Potential Technology Spillovers
3.1 Introduction
When a multinational enterprise enters a foreign market this can cause ex-
ternal effects on domestic firms. Foreign direct investment may, for example,
improve domestic know-how through technology spillovers. If such a technol-
ogy spillover benefits a company which is a direct competitor to the multi-
national firm, this externality naturally is not in the interest of the MNE.
Strategically there are two key decisions for the multinational enterprise:
The mode of foreign entry and the level of control over the local subsidiary.
The level of control is associated with the ownership structure.1 This in
turn certainly may be influenced by the prospect of a technology spillover
since engagement of a local partner may be the reason for the externality to
come up at all.2 What is the effect of a technology spillover on the choice of
1The notion of ownership as entitling the owner with the residual control rights over
the asset has been put forward by Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990].
2In chapter 4, we analyze the effect of a potential spillover on the incentive to trans-
fer technology and how incentives can be controlled through the ownership structure in
international joint ventures.
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entry mode between setting up a new venture via greenfield investment or
acquisition of a local competitor?
This chapter contributes to answering this question by analyzing the effect
of technology spillovers on the choice of entry mode. In particular, we ask
two questions: What is the effect of technology spillovers on the entry mode
choice under different forms of competition, i.e. quantity competition or price
competition? How affects asymmetric information about a potential spillover
the choice of entry mode? It is very likely that the multinational enterprise
and a local competitor have different information concerning such intangible
assets like know-how and technology. The MNE, for example, might have
private information on whether or not local workers will be employed and
get in contact with sensible information. On the other hand, there may be
private information for the domestic firm whether its workers or managers
are well enough trained to be capable of employing advanced technologies.
Foreign direct investment as a channel of technology transfer has been
analyzed theoretically, for example, in Findlay [1978], Das [1987] or Wang
and Blomstro¨m [1992].3 One of their arguments is that the technological
progress in a developing country depends positively on the technology gap
and on the share of FDI in the capital stock. The empirical literature on the
transfer of know-how and technology across borders identifies mixed evidence
on the impact of FDI on the productivity of domestic firms.4 Kokko [1994],
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee [1998] and Xu [2000] found evidence that
positive spillovers are more likely generated if the technology gap is not too
large and if there exists a minimum threshold of human capital.5 Both of
3For recent surveys on international technology transfer and spillovers see Saggi [2002]
or Blomstro¨m and Kokko [1998].
4International trade can be a source of spillovers, too. Coe and Helpman [1995], Coe
Helpman and Hoffmaister [1997], and Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
[1998] find evidence that foreign trade partners’ R&D influences domestic total factor
productivity.
5Other studies which found positive effects from the presence of MNEs on the produc-
tivity of domestic firms include, for example, the early studies by Caves [1974], Globerman
[1979] or Blomstro¨m [1986].
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these findings are in line with the theoretical results of our model. On the
other hand, there also exists evidence for negative spillovers from foreign
investment on domestically owned plants, e.g. Haddad and Harrison [1993],
Aitken and Harrison [1999] or Djankov and Hoekman [2000].6 However, none
of these studies on technology transfer and spillovers makes a distinction for
the choice of entry mode in FDI.
Even though the choice of entry mode is an important decision for the
organizational form of foreign direct investment it has received relatively lit-
tle attention in the economic literature. Empirically a number of potential
factors influencing the choice of entry mode have been studied. Kogut and
Singh [1988] found that with a greater cultural distance greenfield investment
or joint ventures are more likely to be chosen than acquisition. For invest-
ment in the US there is evidence that large and diversified companies prefer
acquisition as Caves and Mehra [1986] show. This finding gets support in
Meyer [1998] for entry into Central and Eastern Europe. Hennart and Park
[1993] found that greenfield investment is the preferred mode of entry for
R&D intensive Japanese firms for entry into the US. Their results suggest
that acquisitions are used by investors with weak competitive advantages,
while investors with strong advantages find that greenfield investment is a
more efficient entry mode.7 Both of these findings are supported by the theo-
retical results of our model. We show that acquisition is the efficient mode of
entry when technologies are sufficiently similar, while greenfield investment
is the preferred choice when the MNE possesses a very superior technology.
There are only a few theoretical papers dealing with the choice of entry
mode in foreign direct investment. Buckley and Casson [1998] and Go¨rg
[2000] analyze the effect of market structure and competition intensity on the
choice of entry mode. Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi [2001] examine how the
choice of entry mode affects the extent of technology transfer and the degree
6Go¨rg and Strobl [2001] review the empirical literature on multinational companies
and productivity spillovers. They argue that the empirical methods used and whether
cross-section or panel analysis is employed can have an effect on the empirical results.
7Andersson and Svensson [1994] found similar results for Swedish multinational firms.
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of competition in the host country.8 These approaches, however, neither take
account of the effect of technology spillovers nor of asymmetric information
on the choice of entry mode.
In a recent paper, Das and Sengupta [2001] analyze the effect of asym-
metric information about different payoff relevant variables on the formation
of international mergers. In particular, they investigate two scenarios, one
where a local firm has private information on market size and one where
a foreign firm has private information on its own technology. Their main
finding is that private information may be a hindrance to the formation of
mergers. However, they assume that merger is the preferred mode of entry in
case of full information. Hence, asymmetric information may result in fewer,
but it cannot result in more mergers.
In contrast to their approach our model allows for both entry modes to
be efficient in the first place. Moreover, we analyze the effect of asymmetric
information over the same variable in both scenarios of private information.
Therefore, we are able to examine the basic effect of a technology spillover
on both types of entry mode and the effect of asymmetric information over
the externality on the strategic entry choice. We consider a multinational
enterprise in possession of a superior technology which can be employed in
a greenfield investment. In this case a technology spillover can occur to the
single local competitor thereby weakening the competitive advantage of the
MNE. Alternatively the MNE could acquire its competitor and thereby avoid
the prospect of a spillover. However, in this case only the inferior technology
of the acquired company can be adopted.
The acquisition price and the profits for both firms concerning both entry
modes are endogenously determined. Theses values which are crucial to the
entry mode choice obviously depend on market characteristics, on the po-
tential technology spillover, and on the technology difference between both
firms. Interestingly, we find that the effect of a technology spillover on the
8See also Bjorvatn [2001] and Norba¨ck and Persson [2002] for theoretical models of the
choice of entry mode.
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entry mode choice crucially depends on the nature of competition. With
quantity competition a technology spillover is a hindrance to acquisitions.
However, with price competition and horizontally differentiated products we
obtain exactly the opposite result. The effects of asymmetric information
about a potential technology spillover on the entry mode choice are indepen-
dent of the form of competition. We also find that private information indeed
has a negative effect on the overall acquisition activity. In contrast to Das
and Sengupta [2001] we show that under certain conditions private informa-
tion may result in acquisitions which would not have taken place under full
information. Finally, we find that the multinational firm ex ante prefers full
information rather than private information. This is particularly surprising
given the fact that the MNE makes the acquisition offer and should thereby
be able to take advantage of its private information. The domestic firm,
however, is better off with private information about a potential spillover.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets
up the basic model. In section 3.3, we determine the optimal entry mode
under full information. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 analyze the entry mode choice
under two scenarios of asymmetric information about a potential technology
spillover. In section 3.6, we compare the different informational scenarios
from an ex ante perspective. The final section discusses extensions and con-
cludes.
3.2 The Model
Consider a multinational enterprise that enters a foreign market. This market
is currently served by a single host country firm (HC). To enter the market
the multinational firm 2 can either acquire the domestic firm 1 or set up a
new venture via greenfield investment. Apart from the multinational firm
there is no other potential entrant. Both firms i = 1, 2 produce at constant
marginal cost ci with no fixed cost. The entering MNE employs a superior
technology than the domestic firm 1 (c¯1 > c2 ≥ 0). This assumption reflects
the fact that a domestic firm located in a country like in Central and Eastern
59
Europe or a developing country has no access to advanced technologies.
The presence of a multinational firm may have an impact on the techno-
logical capabilities of the domestic firm by inducing a technology spillover. A
greenfield investment might, for example, result in a turnover of trained work-
ers from the multinational firm to the domestic firm thereby improving the
know-how of the domestic firm. There are many other avenues one can think
of for the flow of information or know-how. Of course an acquisition could
also lead to a technology spillover. However, in our model an acquisition
can only cause a spillover into another industry since there exists no other
firm. A technology spillover in our model simply results in a reduction of the
production cost for the domestic firm 1 to c1 such that c¯1 > c1 ≥ c2 ≥ 0.9
The spillover occurs with probability q ∈ (0, 1), but the parties may have
private information on whether or not greenfield investment does lead to a
technology spillover. We assume that, if a new venture is set up, information
is revealed and both parties compete in quantities under full information.10
The market demand is represented by a simple linear demand function
p = a − x, where the total quantity sold is denoted by x. In order for all
profits to be non-negative we impose the following restriction on market size:
a ≥ 2c¯1 − c2.
When entering by acquisition the entrant has to use the acquired firm’s
technology c¯1.
11 If instead the entrant sets up a new venture he can imple-
ment the superior technology c2. For simplicity the investment cost for a
greenfield investment is assumed to be k = 0. Hence, by assumption green-
field investment is always a viable opportunity and market entry by MNE
9Thus, the technology spillover can result in a full reduction of the production cost in
the sense that c1 = c2 or only a partial reduction c1 > c2.
10This is for simplicity. Otherwise we get results for incomplete information competition
which simply would make the model more complicated.
11We could also assume that the entrant can implement its own technology by adapting
the production facility which would involve additional costs. This would give us the same
qualitative results.
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will always occur.12 The entry cost in case of acquisition is equal to the
acquisition price since no other cost such as an adaptation cost is involved.
This acquisition price, PA, is endogenously determined. The multinational
enterprise can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to acquire firm 1.13
The time structure of the entry game is the following:
At stage 1, firm 2 (MNE) can choose between making a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to acquire firm 1 (HC), greenfield investment or no market entry.
At stage 2, if firm 2 has made an offer, the incumbent firm 1 can accept or
reject the offer.
At stage 3, firm 2 enters via greenfield investment in case firm 1 has turned
the offer down.
At stage 4, firms enter competition and profits are realized.
Solving this game by backwards induction yields the sub-game perfect
equilibrium of the bargaining game. The exact value of the acquisition offer
depends on the informational structure and on the nature of competition.
With respect to stage 4 we will analyze in the following section the effect of
a technology spillover on the entry mode choice for quantity competition and
besides that for price competition. Therefore, we consider a standard model
of horizontal product differentiation. Consumers are uniformly distributed
along the unit interval [0,1] with density 1. They receive the surplus s from
consumption of the good but incur a linear transportation cost t. HC is
located at x = 0. MNE can choose between acquisition of HC or a greenfield
investment in x = 1.
12For k > 0 greenfield investment may not be viable and therefore no credible option.
This in turn can prevent entry, as shown in chapter 2.
13This constitutes a lower bound for the acquisition price. Other bargaining frameworks,
where HC has bargaining power, too, obviously would lead to a higher acquisition price
and thus shift preferences of the MNE in favor of greenfield investment.
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3.3 Entry Mode Choice under Full Informa-
tion
To begin with, consider the full-information case where both parties know
whether a technology spillover occurs or not. Since greenfield investment is by
assumption always viable the acquisition price PA in equilibrium is equal to
firm 1’s post-greenfield entry profit denoted by pi1(c¯1, c2) if no spillover occurs
or pi1(c1, c2) in case of a spillover. Thus, MNE either chooses acquisition at
price PA equal to firm 1’s greenfield profit or greenfield investment at k = 0
otherwise.
Definition 3.1 p¯ii = pii(c¯1, c2), pii = pii(c1, c2), pi
M
1 = pi
M
1 (c¯1).
Without a technology spillover acquisition at price PA = p¯i1 takes place
whenever
piM1 ≥ p¯i1 + p¯i2. (3.1)
In case of a technology spillover acquisition at price PA = pi1 takes place
whenever
piM1 ≥ pi1 + pi2. (3.2)
How are the profits of both parties and as a result the choice of entry mode
affected by a technology spillover? The spillover only occurs when greenfield
investment is chosen, but it can be avoided by acquisition of the local com-
petitor. Hence, acquisition has the advantage of becoming a monopolist and
avoiding a potential spillover, but it has the disadvantage of a restriction to
an inferior technology. With greenfield investment the technological advan-
tage can be exploited, but then there is competition and also the possibility
of a technology spillover. As a result of this it is not clear in which direction
these effects influence the entry mode choice. It could be argued that acquisi-
tion becomes more attractive if a spillover occurs than in a situation without
a technology spillover since then there is less need for an acquisition. Thus,
more acquisitions should be expected in case of a technology spillover.14
14In our model, either acquisition is chosen or not, in which case there is greenfield
investment. Thus, the number of acquisitions is either 1 or 0. By more acquisitions we
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Quantity competition
As a consequence of a spillover on the one hand the acquisition price increases,
while on the other the greenfield profit for MNE decreases since obviously
pi1 > p¯i1 and p¯i2 > pi2. A priori it is not clear which of these two effects domi-
nates. For some parameter constellations the effect on the greenfield profit is
stronger than the effect on the acquisition price, while for other parameters it
is the other way round.15 Surprisingly, however, we can show that even if the
effect on the greenfield profit dominates, there is an unambiguous tendency
concerning the impact of a spillover on the entry mode choice: A technology
spillover results in fewer acquisitions.
Proposition 3.1 With quantity competition a technology spillover reduces
the parameter space for which acquisition is the optimal entry mode.
Proof: See Appendix.
Hence, with quantity competition a technology spillover results in fewer ac-
quisitions compared to a situation without spillovers. The intuition for this
interesting result is the following. If the effect on the acquisition price domi-
nates, the impact on the entry mode choice is rather natural. Moreover, the
effect on the greenfield profit for MNE dominates only if the difference in
technologies is relatively large. As a consequence there is no further incen-
tive to acquire since the monopoly profit then is comparably small relative to
the greenfield profit for MNE. Therefore, even though the negative effect of
a spillover on the greenfield profit sometimes dominates, this effect is never
strong enough to change the entry mode choice from greenfield investment
(without a spillover) to acquisition (with a spillover). Consequently, condi-
tion (3.2) is more restrictive than condition (3.1).
mean that the condition for which acquisition takes place is less restrictive if a technology
spillover occurs.
15See Lemma 3.3 in the Appendix.
63
Price competition
How robust is this result that a spillover, which could be avoided by acquisi-
tion, results in fewer acquisitions? Suppose firms were to compete in prices,
each producing a horizontally differentiated product. Again, a spillover in-
creases the acquisition price on the one hand, but the greenfield profit for
MNE decreases on the other hand, i.e. pi1 > p¯i1 and p¯i2 > pi2. In contrast
to the case of quantity competition the effect of a spillover on the greenfield
profit (nearly) always dominates the effect on the acquisition price.16 Fur-
thermore, this effect is strong enough to change the entry mode choice from
greenfield investment (without a spillover) to acquisition (with a spillover).
Proposition 3.2 With price competition and horizontally differentiated prod-
ucts a technology spillover extends the parameter space for which acquisition
is the optimal entry mode.
Proof: See Appendix.
Hence, with price competition a technology spillover results in more acqui-
sitions compared to a situation without spillovers. Since the effect on the
greenfield profit for MNE dominates, the impact on the entry mode choice
is fairly obvious. More formally, with price competition and horizontally dif-
ferentiated products condition (3.1) is more restrictive than condition (3.2).
Therefore, it is exactly the opposite result than with quantity competition.
Thus, the overall effect of a technology spillover on the choice of entry
mode crucially depends on the nature of competition. The opposing effects
of a spillover are caused by the fact that products are either strategic sub-
stitutes or strategic complements. A technology spillover has basically two
effects: A direct cost reducing effect for HC and indirect competition effects
on both firms. With quantity competition products are strategic substitutes.
As a consequence of this the two effects on the profit of HC reinforce each
other and dominate the competition effect on MNE. Under price competition
and horizontally differentiated products, prices are strategic complements.
16See Lemma 3.4 in the Appendix.
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Hence, the competition effect of a technology spillover on the profit for MNE
dominates.
3.4 Entry Mode Choice when the Host Coun-
try Firm has Private Information about
Potential Technology Spillovers
Suppose the domestic firm has private information concerning the potential
technology spillover. The host country firm is likely to know whether its
workers or managers will be capable of learning and applying new technolo-
gies or know-how. The multinational firm does not know whether a spillover
will occur in case of a greenfield investment but believes that firm 1’s pro-
duction cost will be c1 or c¯1 with probabilities q and 1 − q respectively. If
greenfield investment is chosen, information is revealed. Therefore, we then
obtain the standard results of the duopoly game.
In case of acquisition there is asymmetric information about the poten-
tial spillover. The uninformed multinational firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer and becomes a monopolist in this market if the offer is accepted. The
domestic firm 1 accepts any offer which gives at least the profit that can be
achieved in competition if greenfield investment would take place. If the do-
mestic firm rejects the offer, MNE enters via greenfield investment and firms
compete in quantities under full information. We obtain the following result
concerning the equilibrium acquisition offer:17
Lemma 3.1 The equilibrium acquisition offer is
(a) PA = pi1 if condition (3.2) is fulfilled and q ≥ qˆ,
(b) PA = p¯i1 if condition (3.2) is fulfilled and q < qˆ,
or if only condition (3.1) is fulfilled,
17Lemma 3.5, in the Appendix, determines the equilibrium acquisition offer if firms
compete in prices.
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(c) PA = 0 if neither condition (3.1) nor (3.2) is fulfilled,
where qˆ =
pi1−p¯i1
piM1 −p¯i1−pi2
.
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, if acquisition is always efficient under full information, i.e. con-
dition (3.2) is met, and the probability of a spillover is high, i.e. q ≥ qˆ, the
uninformed multinational makes a high offer PA = pi1 which is always ac-
cepted. In this case the potential loss of making too high an offer in case
there is no potential for a spillover is outweighed by the benefits of becom-
ing a monopolist (and avoiding the spillover) when actually a spillover would
have occured. On the other hand, if the probability of a spillover is small, i.e.
q < qˆ, it is in a sense too costly to offer a high acquisition price. Therefore,
the multinational makes a low offer PA = p¯i1. Moreover, if an acquisition is
efficient if no spillover occurs but inefficient in case of a spillover [i.e. condi-
tion (3.1) met but (3.2) violated] the multinational always makes a low offer
PA = p¯i1. A low offer is accepted only in case there is no potential for a
spillover and otherwise it is rejected. Finally, if acquisition is never efficient,
i.e. the technology difference is too large, the multinational prefers not to
make an offer but rather enters competition via greenfield investment.
The overall effect of HC’s private information about a potential technol-
ogy spillover on the entry mode is the following.
Proposition 3.3 Private information for HC about a potential technology
spillover reduces the parameter space for which acquisition is the optimal
entry mode.
Proof: See Appendix.
Private information for HC results in fewer acquisitions compared to full
information.18 This follows immediately from the determination of the equi-
librium acquisition offer. MNE makes a high offer only if acquisition is ef-
ficient anyway. Hence, a high offer has no effect on the overall acquisition
18In the Appendix, we prove that this result is obtained also for the case of price
competition and horizontally differentiated products.
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activity but on both parties’ payoffs. This is also true for the case of no
offer, PA = 0, where acquisition is always inefficient even with full informa-
tion. If the multinational makes a low offer, PA = p¯i1, this is accepted only
if no spillover occurs. Otherwise a low offer is rejected. This has no effect
on the acquisition activity if only condition (3.1) is fulfilled. However, the
multinational sometimes enters via greenfield investment even though with
full information acquisition would be efficient, i.e. if condition (3.2) is met.
We can summarize, private information for HC about a potential technology
spillover has a negative effect on the overall acquisition activity.
For a given spillover, after the acquisition offer has been made and entry
took place, the question is: which party has an advantage or a disadvantage
because of the asymmetric information? It should be expected that the
informed party gains from having an informational advantage. But as the
following result shows this is not always the case:
Proposition 3.4 Compared to full information HC gains from private in-
formation if condition (3.2) is fulfilled and q ≥ qˆ, if there is no potential for
a spillover.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is pretty straightforward. HC can take advan-
tage from private information only if MNE offers more than the actual post
greenfield profit. This happens if the multinational expects a spillover to
occur with a high probability and therefore makes a high offer, but there
is no potential for a spillover, i.e. a spillover would not have occured. As
Lemma 3.1 shows, a high offer is only made if acquisition is efficient in any
case, i.e. (3.2) is fulfilled. Therefore, the technological difference and/or the
potential technology spillover should not be too large. In all other situations
HC receives a payoff which is equal to its post greenfield entry profit.
Considering the situation for the multinational firm we find that the MNE
always loses compared to full information if HC gains. Furthermore, the
multinational sometimes forgoes an efficient acquisition if a spillover is ex-
pected to be not very likely but it actually occurs.
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Proposition 3.5 Compared to full information MNE suffers from private
information for HC if condition (3.2) is fulfilled and q < qˆ (q ≥ qˆ), if there
is (no) potential for a spillover.
Proof: See Appendix.
Acquisition is efficient in any case and thus condition (3.2) is fulfilled only
if the difference in technologies and/or the technology spillover is sufficiently
small. Otherwise, if the technology difference or the spillover is too large,
the monopoly profit is too small relative to the sum of the acquisition price
and the greenfield profit for MNE. Thus, private information for HC about
the potential technology spillover may have an effect on payoffs only if the
technological difference and therefore the potential spillover is not too large.
Compared to the full information case MNE sometimes makes an offer which
is too high given that no spillover would have occured. Or MNE sometimes
makes an offer which is too low given that a spillover actually occurs. In the
former case the domestic firm gains from its private information, while in the
latter case it makes no difference to HC.
3.5 Entry Mode Choice when the Multina-
tional Enterprise has Private Information
about Potential Technology Spillovers
Now suppose that the multinational enterprise has private information about
the potential technology spillover. MNE might, for example, know whether
local workers are going to get in contact with sensible information concerning
the production technology that might be of value to the domestic competitor.
The domestic firm does not know whether a spillover will occur in case of a
greenfield investment, but believes that its production cost will be c1 or c¯1
with probabilities q and 1− q respectively. Again, if greenfield investment is
chosen, information is revealed and both parties compete in quantities under
full information.
68
The informed multinational makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. By choosing
an appropriate offer the MNE may signal whether there is potential for a
spillover. In a pooling equilibrium information is not revealed by the offer. In
this case the domestic firm accepts any offer which gives at least the expected
post greenfield entry profit, i.e. E[pi1] = qpi1 + (1 − q)p¯i1. In a separating
equilibrium information is revealed and the domestic firm can distinguish
between both types of MNE, i.e with or without potential for a technology
spillover. In this case the domestic firm accepts any offer which gives at least
the respective post greenfield profit. Again, if the offer is rejected or if no
offer is made, MNE enters via greenfield investment and firms compete in
quantities under full information. The following result is obtained:
Lemma 3.2 There exist three possible equilibria for the acquisition offer.
1. If piM1 ≥ E[pi1] + p¯i2 there exists a pooling equilibrium where MNE
offers PA = E[pi1], and this offer is accepted in equilibrium.
2. If pi1 + p¯i2 > pi
M
1 ≥ pi1 + pi2 there exists a separating equilibrium,
where MNE makes a high offer, PA = pi1, only if there is potential for
a spillover. This offer is accepted in equilibrium. Otherwise no offer is
made.
3. If pi1 + pi2 > pi
M
1 there exists a pooling equilibrium where no offer is
made.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is the following. In pooling equilibrium 1. in-
formation is not revealed since MNE makes the same offer, PA = E[pi1],
independently of whether there is potential for a spillover or not. This oc-
curs in equilibrium if it is profitable for both types of MNE to make such an
offer.19 If the multinational gains from such an offer only if there is potential
19Typically signaling games have many equilibria. In our case the problem is that several
offers can be supported as a pooling equilibrium with different sets of beliefs. To be more
precise, any offer PA ∈ (E[pi1], pi1) can be supported as a pooling equilibrium. In these
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for a spillover, information is revealed in separating equilibrium 2. Since then
HC can distinguish the types of MNE it will only accept an offer PA ≥ pi1 if
there is potential for a spillover. Therefore, the equilibrium offer is raised to
PA = pi1 if there is potential for a spillover and otherwise the MNE makes
no offer. Finally, in pooling equilibrium 3. acquisition is not profitable for
either type of MNE. Note that the proposed equilibria might exist at the
same time. More precisely for certain parameter constellations the pooling
equilibrium 1. and the separating equilibrium 2. or both pooling equilib-
ria exist simultaneously.20 The separating equilibrium 2. and the pooling
equilibrium 3. are mutually exclusive.
How is the acquisition activity affected by private information for MNE
about a potential technology spillover? From inspection of the equilibrium
acquisition offers it follows that for certain parameter constellations an ac-
quisition which under full information would have been efficient does not
take place. This happens whenever the multinational firm makes no offer
but (3.1) is fulfilled and a spillover occurs. However, as the following result
claims, under certain conditions acquisition is chosen even though with full
information the multinational firm would have chosen greenfield investment:
Proposition 3.6 If condition (3.2) is not fulfilled, private information for
MNE about a potential technology spillover extends the parameter space for
which acquisition is the optimal entry mode compared to full information in
case of pooling equilibrium 1., i.e. PA = E[pi1].
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If (3.2) is not fulfilled the
MNE chooses greenfield investment under full information if a spillover occurs
simply because acquisition would have been too expensive. With private
information MNE offers a cheaper acquisition price, PA = E[pi1], in pooling
equilibria acquisition is more expensive and therefore the parameter space for which the
respective equilibrium exists is more restricted compared to the one considered here. Thus,
in a sense PA = E[pi1] constitutes a lower bound for the acquisition price.
20See Proof of Lemma 3.2 for a formal description.
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equilibrium 1. and this is always accepted. Thus, acquisition is chosen even
if otherwise a spillover would have occured. Note, however, that this result
holds only if this equilibrium is selected since for the relevant parameter
constellation the pooling equilibria 1. and 3. coexist.
To summarize, we find that under certain conditions the acquisition ac-
tivity is enhanced by private information for MNE. As already mentioned, on
the other hand, private information sometimes prevents efficient acquisitions.
Despite the opposing effects the overall effect of MNE’s private information
about a potential technology spillover on the entry mode is unambiguous.
Proposition 3.7 Private information for MNE about a potential technology
spillover reduces the parameter space for which acquisition is the optimal
entry mode.
Proof: See Appendix.
Thus, private information for MNE results in fewer acquisitions compared to
full information.21 The multinational enterprise sometimes makes no acqui-
sition offer at all even though this would be efficient under full information.
With full information acquisition is efficient if no spillover occurs and (3.1)
is met. In the same situation but with private information for MNE no offer
is chosen in case of separating equilibrium 2. or pooling equilibrium 3. The
positive effect of private information on acquisition activity which was stated
in Proposition 3.6 is more than compensated by these two negative effects.22
Which of the parties gains and which suffers from private information for
MNE about a potential technology spillover for a given spillover? Again, it
could be expected that the informed party can take advantage of its informa-
tion. However, this need not be the case in general. In fact it can be exactly
the opposite, with the uninformed HC gaining from asymmetric information.
21Again, this result is independent of the form of competition as shown in the Appendix.
22Furthermore, the problem of equilibrium selection should be remembered. The result
of Proposition 3.7 is straightforward if instead of pooling equilibrium 1. with PA = E[pi1]
pooling equilibrium 3. with PA = 0 is considered in the respective parameter space.
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The reason for this result is that MNE sometimes offers more than the actual
post greenfield profit to acquire HC.
Proposition 3.8 Compared to full information HC (gains) suffers from pri-
vate information for MNE in pooling equilibrium 1., i.e. PA = E[pi1], if there
is (no) potential for a spillover.
Proof: See Appendix.
The acquisition price PA = E[pi1] is too low compared to full information if a
spillover occurs but it is too high given that no spillover would have occured.
In all other situations HC receives a payoff which is equal to its post greenfield
profit with full information independently of whether greenfield investment
or acquisition takes place.
For the multinational firm it is exactly the other way round when the
equilibrium acquisition offer is equal to PA = E[pi1]. Thus, MNE might
gain or suffer from having private information. But there are additional
disadvantages:
Proposition 3.9 Compared to full information
(a) MNE gains (suffers) from private information in pooling equilibrium
1., i.e. PA = E[pi1], if there is (no) potential for a spillover, or
(b) MNE suffers from private information if condition (3.1) is fulfilled, if
there is no potential for a spillover.
Proof: See Appendix.
The multinational firm takes advantage of its private information only if in
pooling equilibrium 1. a spillover would have occured. Otherwise MNE has
a disadvantage in pooling equilibrium 1. Moreover, in all other cases, if tech-
nologies are sufficiently similar, i.e. (3.1) fulfilled, and there is no potential
for a spillover, MNE chooses greenfield investment even though acquisition
would have been efficient. Hence, the multinational enterprises then suffers
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from its private information, too. In all other situations the MNE achieves
the same payoff as with full information.
Again, private information for MNE about the potential spillover may
have an effect on payoffs only if the technological difference is sufficiently
small. However, this is a bit different from the situation with private infor-
mation for HC about the potential spillover. In some sense the circumstances
for which private information may have an effect on payoffs are more limited
if HC is privately informed than if MNE is privately informed. In the former
situation asymmetric information may have an effect only for very similar
technologies (i.e. condition (3.2) fulfilled). In the latter it may have an effect
also for not too similar technologies (i.e. condition (3.1) fulfilled).
3.6 Comparison of the Different Informational
Scenarios from an Ex Ante Perspective
In this section, we compare the different informational scenarios from an ex
ante perspective. This enables us to judge which of the described situations
should be in the interest of the parties if they were able to choose between
being informed or uninformed in the first place, i.e. before any other decisions
are determined. A priori one might expect that it is always in the interest of
either party to have private information on the potential technology spillover.
At least from an ex ante perspective parties should be able to take advantage
from being privately informed, even though ex post this must not be the case
in general as we have already shown. However, the following result states
that this is not the case for the multinational enterprise.
Proposition 3.10 Ex ante MNE always (weakly) prefers full information
over any kind of asymmetric information.
Proof: See Appendix.
This is particularly surprising given the fact that the MNE proposes the ac-
quisition offer and might thereby further exploit an informational advantage.
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What is the reason for this result? Intuitively, we can state that signaling
its type is too costly for MNE in some sense from an ex ante perspective.
In order to be able to separate the spillover inducing type from the one that
has no potential for a spillover, MNE must refrain from announcing a posi-
tive acquisition offer if no spillover occurs even though this would be efficient.
Moreover, MNE cannot separate in case an acquisition would only be efficient
if there is no potential for a spillover since any positive offer can be profitably
replicated by the spillover inducing type. To summarize, we can conclude
that the multinational enterprise sometimes must forgo efficient acquisitions
and is therefore not able to take advantage of its private information. Obvi-
ously, private information for HC about the technology spillover cannot be
in the interest of MNE.
With respect to the host country firm we obtain the more straightforward
result that private information is preferred from an ex ante as well as from
an ex post perspective.
Proposition 3.11 Ex ante HC always (weakly) prefers to have private in-
formations.
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, the domestic firm can take advantage of private information since
there is no signaling cost involved. Some kind of signaling and information
revealing takes place by rejection of an offer, which will only happen in case
there is potential for a spillover but a low offer is made.
Obviously, there is a difference between the ex ante and the ex post pref-
erence towards the informational situation. This is not very surprising since a
divergence in ex ante and ex post considerations is a common feature of many
economic issues. What is surprising is the fact that the multinational firm
would not choose to have private information about the potential technology
spillover in the first place. In some sense MNE has the disadvantage of having
to make an acquisition offer in both scenarios of asymmetric information.
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusions
In the existing literature on FDI there is no well developed theory of the
determinants of the choice between greenfield investment and acquisitions.
Nevertheless, it is well recognized that this issue is very important both
from a host country perspective and from the perspective of a multinational
enterprise. As empirical evidence suggests, the strategic entry mode choice is
affected by various firm specific and country specific factors. Among others
the potential for technology spillovers seems to play an important role. We
contribute to the literature by providing a simple theoretical model to analyze
the effects of technology spillovers on the choice of entry mode. In particular,
we examined the effect of asymmetric information about the potential for a
spillover on the entry decision.
First, we showed that under full information the overall effect of a po-
tential technology spillover crucially depends on the nature of competition.
With quantity competition a technology spillover results in fewer acquisi-
tions. With price competition and horizontally differentiated products a
spillover has exactly the opposite effect. Theses contrary effects are caused
by the fact that the choice variables are either strategic substitutes or strate-
gic complements under the two forms of competition.
Previous work emphasized that asymmetric information may be a hin-
drance to the formation of mergers. In contrast, our approach analyzes its
effects on both alternative modes of foreign entry. For the two scenarios of
asymmetric information we also find that this has a negative effect on the
overall acquisition activity. The reason for this is that the multinational
enterprise sometimes must forgo or forgoes otherwise efficient acquisitions.
Furthermore, this result is independent of the nature of competition. Even
though the overall effect is unambiguous, we find that under certain condi-
tions private information for MNE results in acquisitions which would not
have taken place under full information.
Finally, we proved that the domestic firm is always better off when being
privately informed. Interestingly, however, the multinational firm would ex
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ante prefer full information rather than private information about the poten-
tial for a spillover. With private information the MNE sometimes must forgo
efficient acquisitions and also sometimes chooses inefficient acquisitions.
The results of our theoretical model are consistent with empirical evi-
dence on foreign market entry. R&D intensive firms rather prefer to enter
a foreign market via greenfield investment (Caves and Mehra [1986], Meyer
[1998]). Moreover, investors with weak competitive advantages use acquisi-
tions, while investors with strong advantages find greenfield investment to
be the more efficient entry mode.23 Our theoretical results confirm that ac-
quisition should be the preferred mode of entry if the technology difference
is not too large; otherwise greenfield investment is more efficient. Spillovers
may only occur if there exists a certain technology gap. However, there is
evidence that spillovers are more likely if the technology gap is not too large
(Xu [2000]).24 In our model, a spillover can occur (if at all) only in case of
greenfield investment. Greenfield investment takes place either under certain
conditions for an intermediate technology difference or if the multinational
firm possesses a very superior technology. For an intermediate technologi-
cal difference our results exactly indicate that greenfield investment may be
chosen even if the probability of a spillover is high. This in turn can lead
to a technology spillover. Concerning the case of a very superior technology,
we would argue that whether in reality a spillover occurs depends very much
on the absorptive capacity of the domestic firm. Of course in our model this
has no effect on the entry mode choice since for a large technology gap the
MNE always prefers greenfield investment.
An extension of the model could include the analysis of the choice of
entry mode when there are more potential targets for acquisition in the mar-
ket. In this case it is well known that the scope for a profitable merger is
23See Hennart and Park [1993] and Andersson and Svensson [1994].
24The stock of human capital limits the absorptive capacity of a developing country, as
already emphasized in Nelson and Phelps [1966] and empirically tested by Benhabib and
Spiegel [1994].
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limited.25 Moreover, it then would be necessary to determine exactly under
which circumstances a spillover occurs and whether it benefits all companies
in the respective market. These and other considerations are left for future
research.
25See, for example, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds [1983], Levin [1990], Kamien and Zang
[1990] or Gilbert and Newbery [1992] for theoretical discussions.
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Appendix
A) The effect of a technology spillover on the greenfield profit and
on the acquisition price
Lemma 3.3 With quantity competition a technology spillover, i.e. a decrease
in c1, always results in a decrease in pi2, while PA increases.
Proof:
With asymmetric costs the greenfield profit for the MNE and the acquisition
price are
pi2 =
(a− 2c2 + c1)2
9
;PA =
(a− 2c1 + c2)2
9
.
Differentiating pi2 and PA with respect to c1 we get
dpi2
dc1
=
2(a− 2c2 + c1)
9
> 0,
dPA
dc1
= −4(a− 2c1 + c2)
9
< 0,
since by assumption a > 2c1 − c2. Moreover,∣∣∣∣∣dpi2dc1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥<
∣∣∣∣∣dPAdc1
∣∣∣∣⇔ 5c1 − 4c2 ≥< a.
Therefore, the effect of a marginal reduction in c1, i.e. a technology spillover,
on the greenfield profit of MNE dominates only if the difference in technolo-
gies is sufficiently large.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.4 With price competition and horizontally differentiated products
a technology spillover, i.e. a decrease in c1, always results in a decrease in
pi2, while PA (weakly) increases.
Proof:
Consider a standard model of horizontal product differentiation with firms
competing in prices. Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed
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along the unit interval [0,1] with density 1. HC is located at x = 0 and MNE
can choose between acquisition of HC or a greenfield investment with k = 0
in location x = 1. Consumers receive the surplus s from consumption but
they have to incur a transportation cost t which is linear in the distance to
the firm from which the good is bought. Depending on market characteristics
there are three situations that have to be considered.26 The profit for the
multinational firm and the acquisition price in these three cases are:
Case 1: If t < c1−c2
3
, MNE can force its competitor out of the market by a
greenfield investment:
pi2 = c1 − c2 − t; PA = 0.
Case 2: If t ≥ c1−c2
3
and s ≥ 1
2
(c1+ c2+3t), there exists a marginal consumer
with location x˜ who is indifferent between buying from HC or MNE:
pi2 =
(c1 − c2 + 3t)2
18t
; PA =
(c2 − c1 + 3t)2
18t
.
Case 3: Both firms have local monopoly power over their consumers. Here,
two more situations have to be considered:
(a) If t ≥ c1−c2
3
and 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t) > s >
1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t), prices are chosen
such that the marginal consumer at x˜ is indifferent between the firms and
between buying or not:
pi2 =
(
6s− c1 − 5c2 − 3t
6
)(
c1 − c2 + 3t
6t
)
;
PA =
(
6s− 5c1 − c2 − 3t
6
)(
c2 − c1 + 3t
6t
)
.
(b) If t ≥ c1−c2
3
and 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) ≥ s, HC chooses its monopoly price
and MNE sets a price such that there exists a consumer who is indifferent
between the firms and between buying or not:
pi2 =
(
3s− c1 − 2c2 − 2t
2
)(
2t+ c1 − s
2t
)
; PA =
(s− c1)2
4t
.
Differentiating pi2 and PA with respect to c1 in the different cases we get:
26See chapter 2 for a detailed analysis.
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Case 1:
dpiG2
dc1
= 1, dPA
dc1
= 0.
Case 2:
dpiG2
dc1
= c1−c2+3t
9t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= c1−c2−3t
9t
≤ 0.
Case 3: (a)
dpiG2
dc1
= 3s−c1−2c2−3t
18t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= 5c1−2c2−6t−3s
18t
< 0.
(b)
dpiG2
dc1
= 2s−c1−c2−2t
2t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= − s−c1
2t
< 0.
Moreover, it is easy to see that in Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 (b) we have∣∣∣∣dpi2dc1
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣dPAdc1
∣∣∣∣,
while in Case 3 (a)∣∣∣dpi2
dc1
∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣dPA
dc1
∣∣∣, for c1−c2
3
≤ t ≤ 4(c1−c2)
9
, and
∣∣∣dpi2
dc1
∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣dPA
dc1
∣∣∣, for t > 4(c1−c2)
9
.
Therefore, the effect of a marginal reduction in c1, i.e. a technology spillover,
on the greenfield profit of MNE always dominates except under certain con-
ditions for Case 3 (a).
Q.E.D.
B) Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
We simply have to show that with quantity competition condition (3.2) is
more restrictive than condition (3.1). The monopoly profit with technology
c¯1 is given by
piM1 =
(a− c¯1)2
4
.
The greenfield profits for both parties if or if not a spillover occurs, respec-
tively, are given by
pi1 =
(a− 2c1 + c2)2
9
; pi2 =
(a− 2c2 + c1)2
9
;
p¯i1 =
(a− 2c¯1 + c2)2
9
; p¯i2 =
(a− 2c2 + c¯1)2
9
.
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Thus, condition (3.1) becomes
(a− c¯1)2
4
≥ (a− 2c¯1 + c2)
2
9
+
(a− 2c2 + c¯1)2
9
.
⇔ a ≥ 5c¯1 − 4c2 ±
√
(c¯1 − c2)2
⇒ a ≥ 11c¯1 − 10c2. (3.1′)
(The other solution can be neglected since by assumption a ≥ 2c¯1 − c2.)
Condition (3.2) becomes
(a− c¯1)2
4
≥ (a− 2c1 + c2)
2
9
+
(a− 2c2 + c1)2
9
⇔ a ≥ 9c¯1 − 4c2 − 4c1 ± 6
√
c22 − 2c¯1c2 + 2c¯21 − 2c¯1c1 + c21.
⇒ a ≥ 9c¯1 − 4c2 − 4c1 + 6
√
(c¯1 − c2)2 + (c¯1 − c1)2. (3.2′)
(The other solution again can be neglected).
Define ∆ = c¯1 − c1 > 0. Thus, ∆ is the potential spillover.
Condition (3.2′) is more restrictive than condition (3.1′) if
9c¯1 − 4c2 − 4c1 + 6
√
c22 − 2c¯1c2 + 2c¯21 − 2c¯1c1 + c21 > 11c¯1 − 10c2
⇔ 17c¯21 − 12c¯1c2 − 22c¯1c1 + 5c21 + 12c1c2 > 0
⇔ 12c¯1 − 12c2 + 5∆ > 0.
The final inequality holds since c¯1 > c2 and ∆ > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
We have to show that with price competition and horizontally differenti-
ated products condition (3.1) is more restrictive than condition (3.2). The
monopoly profit with technology c¯1 is
piM1 =
 s− t− c¯1 , if s ≥ c¯1 + 2t,(s−c¯1)2
4t
, otherwise.
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Acquisition is the optimal mode of entry if the respective monopoly profit
exceeds the sum of the greenfield profit for MNE and of the acquisition price,
which is reflected in conditions (3.1) and (3.2). By Proof of Lemma 3.4 we
already know that the effect of a marginal reduction in c1 on the greenfield
profit for MNE dominates the effect on the acquisition price in all cases
except under certain conditions for Case 3 (a). Therefore, it is obvious that
in all these other cases a spillover results in acquisition becoming relatively
more attractive, or, in other words, condition (3.1) being more restrictive
than (3.2).
The greenfield profits for both parties in Case 3 (a) if no spillover occurs are
given by
p¯i1 =
(
6s− 5c¯1 − c2 − 3t
6
)(
c2 − c¯1 + 3t
6t
)
;
p¯i2 =
(
6s− c¯1 − 5c2 − 3t
6
)(
c¯1 − c2 + 3t
6t
)
.
Thus, condition (3.1) becomes
(s−c¯1)2
4t
≥
(
6s−5c¯1−c2−3t
6
)(
c2−c¯1+3t
6t
)
+
(
6s−c¯1−5c2−3t
6
)(
c¯1−c2+3t
6t
)
⇔ s ≤ c¯1 + 2t± 2
√
1
9
(c¯1 − c2)2 + 1
2
t(c¯1 − c2 + t)
⇒ s ≤ c¯1 + 2t− 2
√
1
9
(c¯1 − c2)2 + 1
2
t(c¯1 − c2 + t). (3.1′′)
(The other solution can be neglected since in Case 3 we have s < c¯1 + 2t.)
However, condition (3.1′′) can never be fulfilled because in Case 3 (a) we
must have s > 1
3
(2c¯1 + c2 + 3t):
1
3
(2c¯1 + c2 + 3t) > c¯1 + 2t− 2
√
1
9
(c¯1 − c2)2 + 1
2
t(c¯1 − c2 + t)
⇔ 9t2 + 12tc¯1 − 12tc2 > −3(c¯1 − c2)2.
The final inequality holds since c¯1 > c2.
Thus, in other words, without a spillover greenfield investment is always the
optimal entry mode in Case 3 (a). If, on the other hand, a spillover occurs
this will at least not result in fewer acquisitions independently of whether
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condition (3.2) can be fulfilled in Case 3 (a). Note finally that in Case 3 (b)
acquisition will never take place anyway.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
In equilibrium MNE will obviously never offer PA > pi1 since the domestic
firm accepts PA = pi1 anyway. We can also ignore any offer 0 < PA < p¯i1
which will always be rejected by the domestic firm and it is payoff equivalent
to an offer PA = 0. Moreover, any offer p¯i1 < PA < pi1 cannot be an equilib-
rium offer since this would only be accepted if no spillover occurs which can
also be achieved by offering PA = p¯i1. Therefore, the multinational firm will
offer PA = pi1 or PA = p¯i1 or PA = 0 depending on the efficiency of acquisition
and on the probability of a spillover.
If (3.2) is met, acquisition is efficient independently of a spillover. The multi-
national prefers to offer PA = pi1 instead of PA = p¯i1 if the probability of a
spillover q is high enough such that the gain from becoming a monopolist
outweighs the loss of a too high offer in case no spillover would have occured:
piM1 − pi1 ≥ qpi2 + (1− q)[piM1 − p¯i1]
⇔ q ≥ pi1 − p¯i1
piM1 − p¯i1 − pi2
= qˆ.
Where qˆ ∈ (0, 1) since pi1 > p¯i1 and by (3.2).
If only condition (3.1) is fulfilled acquisition at price PA = p¯i1 is efficient and
will be accepted only if there is no potential for a spillover. Otherwise this
offer is rejected. If acquisition is never efficient PA = 0 is chosen.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
There are three types of possible equilibrium acquisition offers PA which can
be supported by different sets of beliefs for different parameter constellations:
1. A pooling equilibrium in which the MNE makes an offer which is always
accepted.
83
2. A separating equilibrium in which MNE makes an offer only if there is
potential for a spillover. This offer is accepted. Otherwise MNE makes
no offer.
3. A pooling equilibrium in which MNE never makes an offer indepen-
dently of its type.
Pooling equilibrium 1.: Consider an acquisition offer with PA = E[pi1], where
E[pi1] = qpi1 + (1− q)p¯i1 and suppose that each type of MNE makes such an
offer. According to Bayes’ rule the updated belief of HC is then q˜ = q, i.e.
HC does not learn anything. For the out-of-equilibrium belief Baye’s Rule
cannot be applied and HC is free to believe anything. However, updating has
to be consistent with the equilibrium strategies. The proposed equilibrium
acquisition offer can be supported by an out-of-equilibrium belief q˜ = 1. Such
an equilibrium exists if both types of MNE, i.e. with or without potential for
a spillover, gain from such an offer:
piM1 − E[pi1] ≥ p¯i2
⇔ piM1 ≥ E[pi1] + p¯i2. (3.3)
Separating equilibrium 2.: The MNE with potential for a spillover makes a
high offer PA = pi1, while the other type makes no offer. Thus, HC can always
update its beliefs according to Baye’s Rule. Therefore, if PA = pi1 is observed,
the updated belief becomes q˜ = 1 and otherwise q˜ = 0. The proposed
equilibrium exists if condition (3.2) is fulfilled and if it’s not worthwhile for
the type of MNE without potential for a spillover to imitate, i.e. if
piM1 − pi1 < p¯i2
⇔ p¯i2 + pi1 > piM1 . (3.4)
Obviously, conditions (3.4) and (3.2) can be simultaneously fulfilled since
p¯i2 > pi2.
Finally, pooling equilibrium 3. with PA = 0 exists if condition (3.2) is not
fulfilled. In this case it is not efficient for a MNE with potential for a spillover
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to acquire. The type of MNE without a potential for a spillover is not able to
separate since any positive offer could be profitably replicated by the other
type of MNE.
The proposed equilibria can exist at the same time. For certain parameter
constellations the pooling equilibrium 1. and the separating equilibrium 2.
or both pooling equilibria exist simultaneously. More precisely, conditions
(3.3) and (3.4) can be fulfilled at the same time and therefore equilibrium 1.
and 2. exist simultaneously if
piM1 − E[pi1] ≥ p¯i2 ≥ piM1 − pi1.
Both pooling equilibria may coexist since (3.3) can be fulfilled and at the
same time (3.2) can be violated if
piM1 − E[pi1] ≥ p¯i2 > pi2 > piM1 − pi1.
In short, coexistence is only given if (3.3) or (3.4) are fulfilled. Otherwise
all proposed equilibria exist independently of each other. Finally, the sepa-
rating equilibrium 2. and the pooling equilibrium 3. are obviously mutually
exclusive by (3.2).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
By Lemma 3.1 with private information for HC acquisition is chosen when-
ever it is also efficient with full information except for the case where (3.2) is
fulfilled and q < qˆ. In this case, if there is potential for a spillover, greenfield
investment takes place even though acquisition would have been efficient.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.4:
HC can gain only if MNE offers more than the actual post greenfield profit
for HC. This happens if (3.2) is fulfilled and q ≥ qˆ, but there is no potential
for a spillover. In this case MNE makes a high offer, PA = pi1, if HC is
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privately informed, while MNE would make a low offer, PA = p¯i, with full
information. Condition (3.2) is fulfilled if the technology difference and/or
the potential spillover, i.e. c¯1 − c2 and/or ∆ = c¯1 − c1, are not too large as
inspection of condition (3.2′) in proof of Proposition 3.1 displays. In all other
situations HC receives the same payoff with private information as with full
information.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.5:
MNE suffers from private information if either the domestic firm is acquired
too expensive or acquisition inefficiently not takes place. This can happen
only if (3.2) is fulfilled. In this case if q ≥ qˆ MNE offers too much if there is no
potential for a spillover or if q < qˆ MNE offers too little and thus acquisition
not takes place if a spillover actually occurs. In all other situations MNE
receives the same payoff with private information as with full information.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.6:
With full information if condition (3.1) is met but (3.2) is not fulfilled and
a spillover occurs, MNE chooses greenfield investment since acquisition at
price PA = pi1 is too expensive relative to the monopoly profit. If no spillover
occurs MNE acquires the domestic firm at price PA = p¯i1. With private in-
formation for MNE the acquisition price in pooling equilibrium 1. becomes
PA = E[pi1] and this is always accepted. Therefore, the acquisition price is
low enough for acquisition to be profitable even if there is potential for a
spillover. Since for certain parameter constellations the pooling equilibrium
1. exists, if (3.3) is fulfilled and simultaneously (3.2) violated, private infor-
mation for MNE may thus lead to more acquisitions than full information.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3.7:
By Lemma 3.2 with private information for MNE, if condition (3.1) is met, in
separating equilibrium 2. or pooling equilibrium 3. acquisition inefficiently
does not take place if there is no potential for a spillover. Therefore, pri-
vate information has a negative effect on the acquisition activity. However,
by Proposition 3.6 pooling equilibrium 1. leads under certain conditions to
more acquisitions than full information. But overall this positive effect on
the acquisition activity is more than offset by the two negative effects.
More formally, pooling equilibrium 1. results in acquisitions which would not
have taken place under full information within the parameter space in which
conditions (3.1) and (3.3) are met and condition (3.2) is violated. Separating
equilibrium 2. and pooling equilibrium 3.may result in greenfield investment,
while for full information acquisition would have taken place within the pa-
rameter space in which condition (3.3) is not fulfilled but conditions (3.1)
and (3.4) are met. Since conditions (3.2) and (3.3) cross for some value of
q ∈ (0, 1) the former parameter space must be smaller than the latter.27
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.8:
From the view of HC in pooling equilibrium 1. the acquisition price PA =
E[pi1] is too small compared to the acceptable offer under full information if
there is potential for a spillover and it is too large otherwise. Therefore, HC
suffers from private information for MNE in the former case, while it gains in
the latter. In all other situations HC receives a payoff which is equivalent to
its post greenfield profit independently of whether acquisition or greenfield
investment is chosen.
Q.E.D.
27See Figure 3.1 for a graphical illustration. In Figure 3.1 the parameter space for which
pooling equilibrium 1. results in more acquisitions is represented by the triangle between
the lines (3.2) and (3.3) and q = 0. The other situation is represented by the triangle
between the lines (3.1) and (3.3) and q = 1. Note that the former space is always smaller
than the latter independently of the exact relation between conditions (3.1) - (3.4).
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Proof of Proposition 3.9:
MNE gains from having private information only in pooling equilibrium if
there is potential for a spillover. In this situation the acquisition price PA =
E[pi1] is smaller than it would be with full information. The multinational
cannot take advantage of its private information in any other situation. On
the other hand, MNE acquires HC at a too high price in pooling equilibrium
1. if no spillover would have occured. Moreover, MNE also suffers from being
privately informed if condition (3.1) is fulfilled and a spillover does not occur.
In this case with full information acquisition would have been efficient but
greenfield investment is chosen if MNE is privately informed.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.10:
First, we derive the expected payoffs for MNE for the different informational
scenarios.
1. Full Information:
E[pi1] = qpi1 + (1− q)p¯i1.
(a) E[pi2] = pi
M
1 −E[pi1], if conditions (3.1) and (3.2) are fulfilled.
(b) E[pi2] = qpi2+ (1− q)[piM1 − p¯i1], if only condition (3.1) is fulfilled.
(c) E[pi2] = qpi2 + (1− q)p¯i2, if none of the conditions is fulfilled.
2. Private Information for HC:
(a) E[pi2|q ≥ qˆ] = piM1 − pi1 or
E[pi2|q < qˆ] = qpi2+(1−q)[piM1 −p¯i1], if conditions (3.1) and (3.2) are met.
(b) E[pi2] = qpi2 + (1− q)[piM1 − p¯i1], if only condition (3.1) is fulfilled.
(c) E[pi2] = qpi2 + (1− q)p¯i2, if none of the conditions is fulfilled.
3. Private Information for MNE:
E[pi1] = qpi1 + (1− q)p¯i1.
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(a) E[pi2] = pi
M
1 −E[pi1], if (3.3) is fulfilled.
(b) E[pi2] = q[pi
M
1 −pi1]+(1−q)p¯i2, if conditions (3.2) and (3.4) are fulfilled.
(c) E[pi2] = qpi2 + (1− q)p¯i2, if (3.2) is not fulfilled.
Comparison of the different expected profits for MNE shows that the full
information expected profit always weakly dominates the expected profit
with asymmetric information. More precisely, expected profits when HC has
private information are equal to the full information case except in (a) where
the expected profit with full information is higher:
1. piM1 −E[pi1] > piM1 −pi1, which obviously is fulfilled.
2. piM1 − E[pi1] > qpi2 + (1− q)[piM1 − p¯i1]⇔ piM1 > pi1 + pi2, fulfilled by (3.2).
Now we compare expected profits with full information and with private
information for MNE. Pooling equilibrium 1. and full information yield the
same expected profit if (3.2) is met. Otherwise if (3.2) is not fulfilled the
expected profit with full information is higher:
qpi2 + (1− q)[piM1 − p¯i1] > piM1 − E[pi1]⇔ pi1 + pi2 > piM1 .
Separating equilibrium 2. always yields a lower expected payoff than the full
information expected payoff:
piM1 −E[pi1] > q[piM1 −pi1]+(1−q)p¯i2 ⇔ piM1 > p¯i1+p¯i2 , which is fulfilled by (3.2).
Finally, pooling equilibrium 3. yields the same expected payoff as with full
information if (3.1) is violated. Otherwise if (3.1) is fulfilled the full infor-
mation expected payoff is larger:
qpi2 + (1− q)[piM1 − p¯i1] > qpi2 + (1− q)p¯i2 ⇔ piM1 > p¯i1 + p¯i2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.11:
HC’s expected payoff is equal to
E[pi1] = qpi1 + (1− q)p¯i1
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except for the case of private information for HC and condition (3.1) fulfilled.
In this case if (3.1) is met the expected payoff is
E[pi1|q ≥ qˆ] = pi1, or
E[pi1|q < qˆ] = qpi1 + (1− q)p¯i1.
Thus, HC always receives the same expected payoff with the above exception
in all cases. Since for q ≥ qˆ the expected payoff is larger, HC (weakly) prefers
private information.
Q.E.D.
Relative relation between conditions (3.1) - (3.4):
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Figure 3.1: Relation of conditions (3.1) - (3.4) under quantity competition.
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C) Asymmetric information and price competition
We will now show that the effects of asymmetric information about a po-
tential technology spillover on the entry mode remain qualitatively the same
for the case of price competition with horizontally differentiated products.
Hence, asymmetric information reduces the parameter space for which ac-
quisition is the optimal entry mode. The main difference is that condition
(3.1) is more restrictive than (3.2), as already shown in Proposition 3.2.
The effects of asymmetric information differ with respect to the equilib-
rium acquisition offer, if the domestic firm has private information about
potential technology spillovers:
Lemma 3.5 The equilibrium acquisition offer is
(a) PA = pi1 if condition (3.1) is fulfilled and q ≥ qˆ,
or if only condition (3.2) is fulfilled and q ≥ q˜,
(b) PA = p¯i1 if condition (3.1) is fulfilled and q < qˆ,
(c) PA = 0 otherwise,
where qˆ =
pi1−p¯i1
piM1 −p¯i1−pi2
and q˜ =
pi1+p¯i2−piM1
p¯i2−pi2 .
Proof:
As argued in proof of Lemma 3.1, MNE will offer PA = pi1, PA = p¯i1 or
PA = 0 depending on the efficiency of acquisition and on the probability of
a spillover.
If (3.1) is met, acquisition is efficient independently of a spillover. MNE
prefers to offer PA = pi1 instead of PA = p¯i1, if the probability of a spillover
q is high enough such that the gain from becoming a monopolist outweighs
the loss of a too high offer in case there is no potential for a spillover:
piM1 − pi1 ≥ qpi2 + (1− q)[piM1 − p¯i1]
⇔ q ≥ pi1 − p¯i1
piM1 − p¯i1 − pi2
= qˆ.
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Where qˆ ∈ (0, 1) since pi1 > p¯i1 and by (3.2). Otherwise MNE offers PA = p¯i1.
If only condition (3.2) is fulfilled acquisition is efficient only if there is poten-
tial for a spillover. MNE prefers to offer PA = pi1 instead of no offer, PA = 0,
if the probability of a spillover q is high enough:
piM1 − pi1 ≥ qpi2 + (1− q)p¯i2
⇔ q ≥ pi1 + p¯i2 − pi
M
1
p¯i2 − pi2
= q˜.
Where q˜ ∈ (0, 1) since: 1. pi1 + p¯i2 > p¯i1 + p¯i2 > piM1 , because (3.1) is not met.
2. p¯i2 − pi2 > pi1 + p¯i2 − piM1 ⇔ piM1 > pi1 + pi2 by (3.2).
Otherwise acquisition is not efficient and hence PA = 0 is chosen.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.5 shows that Proposition 3.3 is valid also with price competition.
Asymmetric information reduces the parameter space for which acquisition
is the optimal entry mode. The reason for this is the following. With private
information for MNE greenfield investment is chosen, while acquisition is
efficient with full information, if:
1. (3.1) is fulfilled and q < qˆ.
2. only (3.2) is fulfilled and q < q˜ and a spillover occurs.
On the other hand, if (3.2) is fulfilled and q ≥ q˜ but there is no potential
for a spillover, MNE chooses acquisition even though under full information
greenfield investment would have taken place. However, overall this positive
effect on the acquisition activity is more than offset by the two negative
effects.
If MNE has private information about potential technology spillovers
Lemma 3.2 still applies. Moreover, Proposition 3.7 remains also unchanged.
In contrast to quantity competition condition (3.1) is more restrictive than
(3.2). As a consequence, there cannot exist parameter constellations where
under private information for MNE acquisition takes place even though with
full information MNE would have chosen greenfield investment. However,
there are cases where MNE makes no acquisition offer even though this would
92
have been efficient under full information, i.e. in separating equilibrium 2.
Thus, private information for MNE reduces the parameter space for which
acquisition is the optimal mode of entry. Figure 3.2 gives a graphical illus-
tration of conditions (3.1) - (3.4) under price competition:
Relative relation between conditions (3.1) - (3.4):
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Figure 3.2: Relation of conditions (3.1) - (3.4) under price competition with
horizontally differentiated products.
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Chapter 4
Technology Transfer and
Spillovers in International Joint
Ventures
4.1 Introduction
There are two important decisions concerning foreign direct investment by
a multinational enterprise. First, the mode of foreign entry has to be deter-
mined. The MNE can choose between the acquisition of an existing company
or setting up a new venture via greenfield investment. Both entry modes have
different consequences for the local market structure and therefore competi-
tion in the market. Second, the level of control over the local engagement has
to be determined. The MNE can either choose a wholly owned subsidiary
or a partially owned, as in joint ventures. When a multinational enterprise
possesses a superior technology or a specific knowledge, why should owner-
ship be shared with a foreign partner? What are the determining factors
concerning this decision?
The ownership structure is particularly important when the multina-
tional’s competitive advantage stems from intangible assets or technological
leadership. Sharing of ownership gives rise to the possibility of technology
spillovers. This might be due to the fact that it is difficult to write a con-
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tract exactly specifying all aspects of the joint venture and the rights to use
the intangible assets or technology. The problem of spillovers should be re-
duced when the MNE owns a substantial part of the foreign firm.1 Thus,
the two levels of ownership, wholly owned versus partially owned, should
have different implications for the transfer and diffusion of technology. In
order to minimize the potential loss through a spillover a MNE would prefer
full ownership of its local subsidiary. But there also exist good reasons why
the MNE would voluntarily agree to share ownership. Maybe otherwise the
full return of the intangible assets or of the superior technology cannot be
achieved because the MNE lacks local experience. Moreover, direct invest-
ments are subject to sovereign risks. This issue is particularly important in
countries in transition. A government can, for example, choose to indirectly
expropriate the assets of a direct investment through excessive taxation. By
sharing ownership the MNE might be able to reduce the problem of lack of
local experience or the sovereign risk problem.
There exists a large and growing literature on the transfer of knowledge
and technology between countries and its impact on the productivity of do-
mestic firms.2 Two channels for the transfer of know-how can be distin-
guished: International trade and FDI. International trade can be a source
of spillovers through demonstration effects when domestic firms learn the
innovative content of imported goods. Coe and Helpman [1995], Coe, Help-
man and Hoffmaister [1997], and Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie [1998] examine the influence of foreign trade partners’ R&D on do-
mestic total factor productivity. The empirical results confirm that foreign
R&D influences domestic productivity and that the more open countries are
to international trade the more they benefit.3 FDI as a channel of technol-
1This argument is in line with the property rights approach put forward in the seminal
papers by Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990]. Ownership entitles the
owner with all residual rights of control over all aspects of the asset.
2See Saggi [2002] or Blomstro¨m and Kokko [1998] for recent surveys on international
technology transfer and spillovers.
3Keller [1998] doubts the importance of international trade patterns and shows that
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ogy transfer has been examined in Kokko [1994], Borensztein, De Gregorio
and Lee [1998], Aitken and Harrison [1999] and Xu [2000].4 The empirical
results of theses studies are substantially different.5 Kokko, Borensztein et
al. and Xu show that positive spillovers are more likely if the technology
gap between foreign and domestic firms is not too large and if there exists
a minimum threshold of human capital.6 Aitken and Harrison find negative
spillovers from foreign investment on domestically owned plants and state
that the gains from FDI appear to be entirely captured by joint ventures.7
There also exists some work on the interaction of spillovers and the own-
ership structure in joint ventures. Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm [1999] analyze
the effects of shared ownership on technology transfer and spillovers. They
argue that, as generally believed, local participation with multinationals re-
veals their proprietary knowledge and in that way facilitates spillovers. This
in turn might provide less incentive for the multinational to transfer tech-
nology and management skills. Their empirical results show that domestic
establishments benefit from spillovers in terms of productivity levels, but
the degree of foreign ownership does not affect the extent of it. In contrast,
Dimelis and Louri [2002] find evidence that the degree of foreign ownership
matters, and productivity spillovers are found to be stronger when foreign
firms are in minority positions.8 Nakamura and Xie [1998] consider a sit-
randomly created trade patterns also give rise to positive international R&D spillovers,
which are often larger and explain more of the variation in productivity across countries.
Keller [2002] finds that benefits from foreign spillovers decline with geographical distance.
4The earliest statistical studies of FDI and intra-industry spillovers are Caves [1974]
and Globerman [1979].
5Go¨rg and Strobl [2001] review the literature on multinational companies and produc-
tivity spillovers. They argue that the empirical methods used and whether cross-section
or panel analysis is employed may have an effect on the empirical results.
6While a certain technology gap obviously is necessary for spillovers to occur, this
finding seems to limit the assumption (e.g. in Findlay [1978] or Wang and Blomstro¨m
[1992]) that spillovers grow with the size of the technology gap.
7Other studies which found evidence for negative spillovers include Haddad and Har-
rison [1993] or Djankov and Hoekman [2000].
8Explanations for the contrasting results of these studies could be the different devel-
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uation with bilateral spillovers. They argue that full ownership and joint
ventures should differ with respect to the diffusion of technology. The own-
ership share should reflect the relative importance of the intangible assets
which the partners bring into the joint venture. Their empirical results con-
firm that imports from the foreign mother and the share of exports from
total revenue have a significant positive effect, while R&D expenditures of
the local partner have a significant negative effect on MNE’s share.
The other strand of literature that is related to our approach concerns
the effects of sovereign risks on foreign direct investment.9 Eaton and Gerso-
vitz [1983] discuss a reputation model of FDI with many potential investors.
If the host country taxes excessively, potential future investors are deterred
and the host country loses access to foreign capital. In a companion pa-
per, Eaton and Gersovitz [1984] show that the threat of nationalization may
induce the foreign investor to choose an inefficient technology which makes
nationalization less attractive to the host country.10
Schnitzer [2002] analyzes the choice between FDI and a combination of
debt finance and a licensing agreement in the presence of sovereign risk.
One result of this static model is that the sovereign risk problem can be
alleviated if the host country and the foreign investor form a joint venture.11
In particular, it is shown that there are circumstances where a joint venture
can be efficiency improving and where the MNE voluntarily agrees to it. This
is caused by the fact that by sharing ownership the host country is given an
incentive to reduce taxation.12
opment levels of the economies examined and differing econometric methodologies used.
9Not relevant for our discussion is the problem of sovereign debt. See Eaton [1993] and
Eaton and Fernandez [1995] for recent surveys.
10Similar issues have been addressed in the literature on incomplete contracts. The
classical notion of the hold-up problem goes back to Williamson [1985].
11Schnitzer [1999] shows in a dynamic model of FDI how cooperation may be sustained.
In particular, it is shown that sovereign risk may induce over- as well as underinvestment.
Moreover, the frequently observed phenomenon of tax holidays is discussed.
12Konrad and Lommerud [2001] show that asymmetric information between the MNE
and the host country as regards intra-firm trade between the MNE and its foreign affiliate
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We ask in particular: How does a potential spillover affect the incen-
tive for a MNE to transfer technology and the policy incentives of the host
country? Moreover, we examine how the incentives of both parties can be
controlled through the ownership structure in an international joint venture.
A spillover directly reduces the profit of the multinational and benefits a
domestic (state-owned) firm. We make a distinction between the potential
for a spillover and the effective spillover. The potential for a spillover deter-
mines the potential benefit to a domestic firm and is taken as exogenously
given. The effective spillover contains the benefit that actually occurs and
this is endogenously determined. The extent of the effective spillover de-
pends on the technology transfer and on the ownership structure. We argue
that the better the transfered technology and the larger the domestic own-
ership share, the larger will be the effective spillover. With respect to the
host country policy we analyze two different scenarios: In scenario 1, the
host country chooses the total amount of taxes to be paid and has thus the
option to expropriate the entire return stream of the project. In scenario
2, the host country does not impose a tax but has the option to invest in
local infrastructure. The difference between the two scenarios is that the
tax can only be raised if the project was successful, while the investment in
infrastructure is undertaken independently of the project’s success. Thus,
the investment cannot be interpreted as just a negative tax, i.e. a subsidy.
This implies a substantial difference in the strategic choice of the two policies
and their impact on technology transfer. In particular, taxation may serve
as a perfect substitute for a spillover, while an infrastructure investment in
general cannot perfectly compensate for a spillover.
The results of our model show for both scenarios that a potential spillover
need not in general have a negative effect on the incentive to transfer tech-
nology. In particular, in contrast to generally believed arguments, we can
show that there are situations where a spillover has a positive effect on the
is another possibility to alleviate the hold-up problem in FDI. By selling shares of the
affiliate to locals the host government is given a further incentive to reduce taxation.
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transfer of technology, on both parties’ payoffs, and on the efficiency of the
project. The extent of the effective spillover increases with the domestic
firm’s ownership share in the joint venture, while the risk of creeping expro-
priation decreases or the incentive to invest in local infrastructure increases.
These effects indicate that an extreme form of ownership (wholly owned or
no equity but licensing) should not always be optimal for the MNE since
one of the effects might destroy the incentive to transfer technology. Our
results confirm for both scenarios that there are circumstances where a joint
venture is mutually beneficial. Moreover, we ask whether or not it should
always be in the interest of the host country to form a joint venture. This
question is of particular interest to countries in Central and Eastern Europe
and other transition countries, where sharing of ownership is often required
by host country governments. However, we show that there exist cases where
it is in the interest of the host country to restrict the ownership share of the
domestic firm or even not to share ownership at all.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets
up the model. Section 4.3 analyzes the effect of spillovers on technology
transfer and the incentives for excessive taxation. In section 4.4, we derive the
results for spillovers and investment by the host country. Section 4.5 discusses
empirical implications of the model, while the final section concludes.
4.2 The Model
When a multinational enterprise engages in foreign direct investment it is
often observed that this is done by forming a joint venture with a local firm.
In countries in Central and Eastern Europe the joint venture partner often
is a state-owned firm. Sometimes the multinational is forced to give away
some share of the project without any compensation which is nothing but
some special form of expropriation.
Consider the following relationship between a multinational enterprise
(MNE) and a state-owned company in a host country (HC). The MNE seeks
to exploit an investment opportunity in HC. This investment cannot be car-
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ried out by the domestic firm, because HC does not have enough funds avail-
able to finance the investment project and cannot obtain a credit on the
international capital market. The investment project requires an initial out-
lay I. Without loss of generality we assume the riskless world interest rate
to be zero. If the project is not carried out, both parties get their outside
utilities, which are normalized to zero.13
MNE and HC can engage in a joint venture where HC receives some share
1 − α of the project’s net profits. MNE gets the remainder of profits and
possesses the control rights of the project. In a first step we assume α to be
exogenously given in period t = 1. Considering the role of the host country
in t = 2 we analyze two different scenarios: In scenario 1, the host country
has the option to expropriate the entire return stream through taxation. HC
chooses the total amount of taxes, T , to be paid. In scenario 2, we assume
that the host country does not impose a tax but has the option to undertake
an investment, M , on its own in order for the project to be valuable. HC
chooses the amount of M , which directly benefits the project. M may be
interpreted as an investment in local infrastructure and has to be spent inde-
pendently of the project’s success. The difference between the two scenarios
is that the tax T can only be raised if the project has been successful, while
the investmentM will be spent independently of the project’s success. Thus,
M cannot be interpreted as just a negative tax, i.e. a subsidy. In t = 3 MNE
has to engage in additional actions, q, which affect the profitability of the
project. For example, MNE may decide on the level of investment in training
local workers and managers, in marketing the produced goods, transferring
or upgrading technology. In t = 4 profits are realized. The time structure is
summarized in Figure 4.1.
The project’s return is stochastic and may be either R or 0. The probability
of success is affected by MNE’s decision to transfer technology in t = 3.
13In principle, there are two possibilities to finance and run the project: debt finance
and foreign direct investment. Since we are interested in determining factors of ownership
structure in international joint ventures we will consider the case of FDI. See Schnitzer
[2002] for an analysis of the choice between FDI and debt finance.
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Figure 4.1: Sequence of events.
Without loss of generality we assume that MNE chooses the probability of
success, q ∈ (0, 1), directly at cost K(q). K(q) is an increasing, strictly
convex function with K ′(0) = 0 and limq→1K(q) =∞. The last assumption
implies that for q sufficiently close to 1, K ′′′(q) > 0. To guarantee uniqueness
of the solutions for the following maximization problems, we assumeK ′′′(q) >
0 for all q ∈ (0, 1). We assume that HC does not only share the revenues
but also the costs from the subsequent investment into technology transfer.
Therefore, it is assumed that a substantial part of these costs will be in
local currency and thus HC can share these costs even without access to
international capital markets or hard currency.
In scenario 2, where HC chooses an investment,M , the cost of investment,
C(M), is borne by HC alone. C(M) is an increasing, strictly convex function
with C ′(0) = 0. We assume that HC is able to finance this infrastructure
investment in local currency.
If the project is carried out in form of a joint venture there is potential
for a spillover S from MNE to HC, where S is exogenously given. The
spillover directly reduces the profit of MNE and benefits HC. We assume that
the size of the effective spillover depends on two things: First, it depends
on the decision to transfer technology and therefore on the probability of
success q. Second, the ownership share 1 − α of HC matters. The first
assumption emphasizes that the better the transfered technology the larger
is the potential gain from a spillover to HC. The second assumption reflects
the fact that the size of the effective spillover depends on the ability to
get access to the MNE’s technology. The possibility to get a closer look at
the special features of the technology and know-how certainly depends on
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the participation of HC. Thus, the effective spillover is equal to q(1 − α)S.
The spillover can be efficient in the sense that the direct reduction of the
multinational’s payoff is smaller than the benefit for the domestic firm and
vice versa for an inefficient spillover. In order to be able to vary the efficiency
of the spillover we introduce an efficiency parameter β > 0. For β = 1 the
effective spillover is symmetric, i.e. the loss for MNE equals the benefit to
HC. If β < 1 the effective spillover is efficient and vice versa for β > 1.
We can now define the payoffs for both parties in the two scenarios. In
scenario 1, where HC chooses the total amount of taxes, T , to be paid, the
parties’ payoffs are
UTMNE = qα[R− T ]− q(1− α)βS − αK(q)− I, (4.1)
and
UTHC = q
[
(1− α)[R− T + S] + T
]
− (1− α)K(q). (4.2)
In scenario 2, where HC chooses investment in infrastructure M , payoffs are
UMMNE = qα[R +M ]− q(1− α)βS − αK(q)− I, (4.3)
and
UMHC = q(1− α)[R +M + S]− C(M)− (1− α)K(q). (4.4)
4.3 Spillovers and Taxation by the Host Coun-
try
Consider MNE’s decision on how much to invest into transferring technology
in the second stage of the project. MNE maximizes (4.1). Given the assump-
tions on K(q) the optimal level of investment q is uniquely characterized by
the following first order condition:
K ′(qT ) = R− T − 1− α
α
βS. (4.5)
Note that qT (T, α) is a strictly decreasing function of T for all T ∈ (0, R −
1−α
α
βS). Note further, that it depends directly on α, MNE’s share of profits,
because of the existence of a spillover.
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When HC decides on the level of taxes to be imposed on the project it
takes into account the effect of T on qT (T, α) and thus on his own share of
profits. HC maximizes (4.2). In the Appendix we prove that HC’s maximiza-
tion problem has a unique interior solution T T (α) ∈ (−(1−α)β−αβ+α
α
S,R−
1−α
α
βS).14 Hence, the optimal amount of taxes T T (α) satisfies the following
first order condition:
dqT (T )
dT
[
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + T T
]
+ αqT (T ) = 0. (4.6)
Note that even if α = 1, HC will choose T T (1) < R such that MNE is
induced to choose a positive q. Moreover, it could be optimal for HC to
choose a negative tax, i.e. a subsidy. The reason for this is that in some
circumstances only by subsidization MNE can be induced to choose a positive
q. In these situations the profit share and the effective spillover outweigh the
cost of the subsidy for HC.
How are the incentives to transfer technology and to raise taxes affected by
the potential spillover S? Intuitively, it could be argued that since a spillover
directly reduces MNE’s payoff its incentive to invest should decrease. At the
same time a spillover should provide an incentive for HC to reduce taxation.
However, the parties’ decisions are interdependent. Hence, a change in S
has a direct effect on T T (α) and qT (T, α) and an indirect effect through the
change in the respective other variable.
We can show that the direct effects of an increase in S on both decisions
are negative as expected. And moreover, the overall effect on T T (α) is always
negative. Thus, the indirect effect on the investment qT (T, α) through the
change in T T (α) is positive. Whether or not this indirect effect dominates
the direct effect of a spillover on qT (T, α) is a priori not clear. We show
that the effects of an increase in the potential spillover on the incentive to
transfer technology and on both parties’ payoffs depend on the efficiency of
the spillover. In particular, in case of an efficient spillover MNE is induced
to increase its technology transfer which results in a positive effect on the
14See Lemma 4.1 in the Appendix.
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parties’ payoffs. The effects of an increase in the potential spillover on the
optimal tax rate, on the optimal investment, on both parties’ payoffs, and
on total surplus are summarized in the following result:
Proposition 4.1 Increasing S has the following effects on the optimal tax
rate T T (α), on the optimal investment in technology transfer qT (T, α), on
both parties’ payoffs, and on the efficiency of the project:
(i) β = 1: dT
T
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
= 0,
dUTMNE
dS
= 0,
dUTHC
dS
= 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dS
= 0.
(ii) β < 1: dT
T
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
> 0,
dUTMNE
dS
> 0,
dUTHC
dS
> 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dS
> 0.
(iii) β > 1: dT
T
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
< 0,
dUTMNE
dS
< 0,
dUTHC
dS
< 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dS
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
As a special case emerges the situation of a symmetric spillover, β = 1. In
this case the optimal tax rate is exactly adjusted for the spillover such that
the optimal investment remains unchanged compared to the case without
a spillover, i.e. qT (T, α) = q∗(T ). To be more precise, the taxation will be
lowered such that in the aggregate the sum of tax rate and spillover is equal
to the taxation when there is no spillover, i.e. T T (α) = T ∗(α) − 1−α
α
S.15
Hence, for β = 1 taxation and spillover are perfect substitutes from HC’s
point of view.
If the spillover is not symmetric, β 6= 1, it is not a perfect substitute for
taxation. Therefore, it has an effect on all variables, on the payoffs of both
parties and on efficiency. The indirect effect of an efficient spillover dom-
inates the direct effect on qT (α) and vice versa for an inefficient spillover.
Therefore, the investment qT (α) increases (decreases) if the spillover is effi-
cient (inefficient). Intuitively we can argue that an efficient spillover, β < 1,
does not harm MNE too much but it fully benefits HC. The opposite is true
for an inefficient spillover. As a result of these effects the parties’ payoffs and
the efficiency of the project also depend on the magnitude of the spillover for
β 6= 1. To be more precise, both parties’ payoffs, and therefore the efficiency
15T ∗(α) and q∗(T ) characterize the optimal choices for S = 0.
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of the project, increase (decrease) in S for β < 1 (β > 1). We can summa-
rize that in contrast to widespread opinions a potential spillover need not in
general reduce the incentive to transfer technology or the efficiency of a joint
venture.
How are the incentives of both parties affected by a change in the own-
ership structure? Intuitively, it could be expected that decreasing the multi-
national’s ownership share α reduces the incentive to transfer technology.
On the other hand, the incentive for HC to choose an excessive taxation is
also reduced. Both effects should be more pronounced in the presence of a
potential spillover. Which of these effects dominates is a priori not clear.
Obviously, since the parties’ incentives are affected by a potential spillover
the effects of a change in the ownership division should also depend on the
spillover. The following proposition summarizes the effects of a decrease in
the multinational’s share α on optimal taxation, on both parties’ payoffs and
on the efficiency of the project:
Proposition 4.2 Suppose S > 0. A decrease of MNE’s share, α, of net
profits reduces the optimal tax rate T T (α). The effect on MNE’s payoff is
ambiguous. For large values of α, there exist cases where MNE benefits from
giving up some share of the project to HC. The effects on HC’s payoff and
on the efficiency of the project depend on the efficiency of the spillover:
(i) β = 1: HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project are strictly increas-
ing as α decreases. The effects are exactly the same as for S = 0.
(ii) β < 1: HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project are strictly increas-
ing as α decreases.
(iii) β > 1: There exist cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the
project increase as α increases. Moreover, there exist cases where HC’s
payoff and the efficiency of the project are maximized if ownership of
the project is not shared.
Proof: See Appendix.
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T T (α) is strictly decreasing as α decreases. Intuitively, the lower α is, the
higher is the share of profits which goes directly to HC. In order to increase
the expected profits of the joint venture HC will restrict the imposed tax.
Proposition 4.2 shows that there are circumstances where a joint venture
agreement is mutually beneficial even in the presence of a spillover. For large
values of α MNE can sometimes benefit from giving away some share of the
profit to HC without being directly compensated for it. By sharing ownership
HC is induced to impose lower taxes thereby increasing overall efficiency and
MNE’s payoff. A joint venture may hence be used to mitigate the problem
of creeping expropriation. This result can be obtained independently of the
efficiency of a spillover even though it could be argued that an inefficient
spillover should reduce the incentive for MNE to share ownership.
We have already shown that a symmetric spillover only has an effect on
the optimal tax rate T T (α). Consequently, it is very intuitive that compared
to a situation without spillovers the effects of a change in α differ only with
respect to the effect on T T (α). Because of the spillover a decrease in α
reduces the optimal tax rate more than it would without a spillover. The
other effects remain unchanged in their magnitude: A decrease in α increases
the efficiency of the project and has a strictly positive effect on HC’s payoff.
An efficient spillover extends the scope for voluntary joint venture agree-
ments. The reason for this is that the spillover benefits HC more than it
reduces MNE’s profit. In this case MNE is given a stronger incentive to
share ownership since thereby taxation is reduced more, while the loss due
to the spillover is comparably small. HC has always an incentive to share
ownership and therefore to enjoy a share of the project’s net profits and to
get access to the effective spillover.
Surprisingly, however, we find that for β > 1, there are cases where HC
benefits and the efficiency of the project increases if α increases. Moreover, it
is sometimes not in the interest of HC nor efficient at all to share ownership.
What is the reason for this result? Increasing α reduces HC’s share of the
net profit and induces HC to increase total taxation. Increasing taxation has
an indirect negative effect on the technology transfer by MNE and therefore
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on the probability of a successful project. On the other hand, increasing α
has a positive direct effect on investment q since the loss due to the spillover
for MNE is reduced. For sufficiently large values of β the latter effect may
become very large and outweigh the effect on the profit share. This result
gives a rationale why full ownership of the project by MNE can sometimes
be in the interest of HC even though only shared ownership gives rise to a
spillover. The finding is particularly interesting for countries in transition or
Eastern European countries where sometimes multinationals are restricted to
shared ownership arrangements. As we show, the negative effects associated
with shared ownership, i.e. the reduced incentive for MNE to further invest,
can become very strong. And thus, it can be optimal for HC to restrict its
own share of the project or even not to share ownership at all, but rather to
enjoy a large expected tax revenue.
4.4 Spillovers and Investment by the Host
Country
Now we ask how both parties’ incentives are affected by a potential spillover
if HC does not impose a tax on the project but instead has the option to
undertake some investment,M , in order to increase the return of the project.
Again, we first consider MNE’s decision on how much to invest in the second
stage of the project. MNE maximizes (4.3). The optimal level of investment
q is characterized by the following first order condition:
K ′(qM) = R +M − 1− α
α
βS. (4.7)
Note that qM(M,α) is a strictly increasing function ofM for allM > 0. Note
further, that it depends directly on α because of the existence of a spillover.
When HC decides on the level of investment, M , it takes into account the
effect on qM(M,α) and thus on its own share of profits. HC maximizes (4.4).
In the Appendix we prove under which conditions HC’s payoff is maximized
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at MM(α) ∈ (M,∞), where M = max{0, 1−α
α
βS−R}.16 Hence, the optimal
investment MM(α) satisfies the following first order condition:
dqM(M)
dM
[
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S
]
+ qM(M)(1− α)− C ′(M) = 0. (4.8)
Note that, if α = 1, HC will choose MM(1) = 0. Thus, the host country has
an incentive to invest in local infrastructure only if ownership of the project
is shared.
How are the incentives to transfer technology and to invest in local in-
frastructure affected by the potential spillover S? Intuitively, it could be
argued that a potential spillover reduces the incentive to transfer technology
because it directly reduces MNE’s payoff. On the other hand, HC is given
a stronger incentive to invest in local infrastructure. Since the parties’ de-
cisions are interdependent a change in S has a direct effect on MM(α) and
qM(M,α) and an indirect effect through the change in the other variable.
As expected, the potential spillover S has a direct negative effect on the
technology transfer qM(M,α) and a direct positive effect on the investment
MM(α). The overall effect on the investment of HC is positive. Thus, the
indirect effect on qM(M,α) is positive and may therefore compensate for the
direct negative effect of S. Which of the effects on the optimal transfer of
technology dominates is a priori not clear. The effects of an increase in the
potential spillover on both parties’ profits and on the efficiency of the project
are also ambiguous as the following proposition states:
Proposition 4.3 Increasing S strictly increases the optimal invest-
ment MM(α). The effects on the optimal investment in technology transfer
qM(M,α), on both parties’ payoffs and on the efficiency of the project are
ambiguous:
dMM
dS
> 0,
dqM
dS
≥
< 0,
dUMMNE
dS
≥
< 0,
dUMHC
dS
≥
< 0,
d(UMMNE + U
M
HC)
dS
≥
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
16See Lemma 4.2 in the Appendix.
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In general, a spillover has, independently of its efficiency β, an effect on
all variables and therefore on both parties’ payoffs and on the efficiency of
the project. Again, as in scenario 1 with taxation by HC, the presence
of a potential spillover need not in general reduce the incentive to transfer
technology.
Contrary to the result in the first scenario, a spillover can affect both
parties’ payoffs and efficiency even if it is symmetric, β = 1. The reason for
this result is thatMM(α) reacts differently than TM(α) in case of a symmetric
spillover. The investment does not in general perfectly compensate for the
spillover and adjust the choice of qM(M,α). This is caused by the fact that
HC has to bear the investment cost C(M) alone and independently of the
project’s success or failure, while the benefit of this investment can only be
enjoyed in case of success.
More surprisingly, however, a spillover can have a negative effect on both
parties’ payoffs and on the efficiency of the project if the spillover is efficient,
β < 1, or a positive effect if it is inefficient, β > 1. This is also in contrast
to the results in scenario 1, where an efficient spillover always has a positive
effect on payoffs and vice versa for an inefficient spillover. In scenario 2,
whether the spillover has a positive or negative effect depends on its impact
on the incentive to invest for HC. Whenever a potential spillover leads to
a strong incentive to invest in infrastructure the multinational is given a
stronger investment incentive as well. This results in a positive effect on
payoffs. Obviously, the host country’s incentive to invest depends on the
nature of the investment costs for local infrastructure. We can conclude that
the cheaper the cost to invest in local infrastructure, or the more efficient the
spillover, the more likely a potential spillover has a positive impact on both
parties’ payoffs.
How are the incentives of both parties affected by a change in the own-
ership structure? Intuitively, it could be expected that decreasing the multi-
national’s ownership share α reduces its incentive to transfer technology.
On the other hand, the incentive for HC to invest in local infrastructure
should increase, which in turn has a positive effect on the incentive for MNE.
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Whether or not one of the effects dominates is ambiguous. Since the par-
ties’ incentives are affected by a potential spillover the effects of a change in
the ownership structure should also depend on the spillover. The following
proposition summarizes the effects of a decrease in the multinational’s share
α on both parties’ payoffs and on the efficiency of the project with or without
the existence of a potential spillover:
Proposition 4.4 A decrease of MNE’s share, α, of net profits increases the
optimal investment MM(α). The effect on MNE’s payoff is ambiguous. For
large values of α, there exist cases where MNE benefits from giving up some
share of the project to HC. The effects on HC’s payoff and on the efficiency
of the project depend on the existence of a spillover:
(i) S = 0: HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project increase as α
decreases.
(ii) S > 0: There exist cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the
project increase as α increases.
Proof: See Appendix.
MM(α) is strictly increasing as α decreases. Intuitively, the lower α the
higher the share of profits which goes directly to HC and also the higher
the share of the return on the investment MM(α). In order to increase the
expected profits of the joint venture HC will extend its investment.
Proposition 4.4 shows that in the absence of a potential spillover, S = 0, a
joint venture can be efficiency improving and beneficial for the multinational
enterprise. Thus, also in this scenario with an investment by HC instead
of taxation there are circumstances where MNE voluntarily gives away a
share of the project without direct monetary compensation.17 HC has always
an incentive to share ownership since it only then enjoys a share of the
17Asiedu and Esfahani [2001] find evidence that any host country characteristic that
increases productivity of local assets in the project tends to lower the foreign equity share.
This might be in the interest of the foreign investor because it provides an incentive for
the host country to improve its infrastructure and thereby enhance productivity.
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project’s return and is given an incentive to invest in local infrastructure.
Consequently, the overall efficiency also increases with a decreasing ownership
share of MNE.
For S > 0 there are again cases where a joint venture agreement is mu-
tually beneficial and hence the multinational would voluntarily agree to it.
HC has an incentive to share ownership and is thereby given the incentive
to invest. Surprisingly, however, the results divert from those in scenario 1
in different aspects. We find that it is sometimes in the interest of HC and
efficient to restrict its ownership share to a small fraction. And moreover,
this result is independent of the efficiency of the spillover. In other words,
even if the spillover is very efficient, β < 1, there are cases where HC is not
interested in holding too large a share of the project. What is the reason for
this counterintuitive result? Whether or not HC would like to hold a share
of the project depends on the exact nature of the investment cost which HC
has to bear independently of success or failure of the project. If investment
in infrastructure is too expensive relative to the return on investment, HC
has only little incentive to invest. This in turn results in only a small positive
effect on the incentive to transfer technology by MNE. Moreover, there exist
cases where for a given ownership division both parties have no incentive to
invest. Therefore, in this scenario our theoretical analysis gives a rationale
against a general restriction of ownership to a specified minimum share of the
domestic partner. However, if HC’s share of the project, 1−α, can be chosen
sufficiently small, both parties have an incentive to invest and the efficiency
of the project can be maximized. The reason for this is that the smaller
HC’s share 1− α is, the smaller is the spillover and hence the smaller is the
investment M needed to compensate for the spillover. Thus, in principle,
HC always has an interest to hold at least a small share of the project.
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4.5 Empirical Implications
With respect to the influence of a potential spillover, the model produces
results which can be straightforwardly interpreted as regards to their empir-
ical implications. In scenario 1, we have shown theoretically that a potential
spillover has a very clearcut and intuitive influence on the parties’ strate-
gic decisions. Regarding the influence of the host country’s taxation policy
on the incentive for MNE to transfer technology and the influence of a po-
tential spillover on the taxation policy itself we can formulate the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4.1 The larger the political risk of the host country, the smaller
the incentive to transfer technology.
Hypothesis 4.2 The larger the potential for a spillover, the smaller the risk
of excessive taxation.
As the model’s results show, the influence of the spillover on the investment
incentive for MNE depends on the efficiency of the spillover:
Hypothesis 4.3 The potential for a spillover should have (a) a positive ef-
fect on the incentive to transfer technology if the effective spillover is efficient
or (b) a negative effect if the effective spillover is inefficient.
In scenario 2 we have shown that the results for the impact on the incentive
to invest are less straightforward. Regarding the influence of the investment
in local infrastructure by the host country on the incentive to transfer tech-
nology and the effect of a potential spillover on the investment incentive we
can state the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4.4 The larger the investment in local infrastructure by the host
country, the larger the incentive to transfer technology.
Hypothesis 4.5 The larger the potential for a spillover, the larger the in-
centive to invest in infrastructure.
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Concerning the influence of a potential spillover we cannot formulate an
unambiguous hypothesis but rather emphasize a tendency with respect to
the efficiency of the effective spillover.
Hypothesis 4.6 The potential for a spillover should tend to have (a) a pos-
itive effect on the incentive to transfer technology if the effective spillover is
efficient or (b) a negative effect if the effective spillover is inefficient.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusions
As previous studies have suggested and often argued, foreign direct invest-
ment is a source for the diffusion of knowledge and technology. It is well
recognized that sharing ownership with a local partner can reveal a multi-
national’s proprietary knowledge and in that way give rise to technology
spillovers. The extent of such technology spillovers certainly depends on the
nature of the transfered technology and on the ownership structure in the
joint venture. We contribute to the literature by providing a simple model
of an international joint venture between a multinational enterprise and a
host country firm. In particular, we analyzed the effects of the potential for
a spillover on the transfer of technology and on the host country’s policy.
Concerning the host country policy we considered two different scenarios:
Taxation or investment in infrastructure.
In contrast to existing arguments we showed that the potential for a
spillover does not necessarily have a negative effect on the incentive to trans-
fer technology. There rather exist cases in both scenarios where a potential
spillover has a positive effect on the transfer of technology and on the ef-
ficiency of the project. In the first scenario this depends crucially on the
efficiency of the spillover. Surprisingly, however, we found that in the second
scenario an efficient spillover can also have a negative effect on both par-
ties’ profits and vice versa for an inefficient spillover. However, besides these
differing results we can still argue that a more efficient spillover generally
has a positive effect on the incentive to transfer technology and thus on the
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efficiency of the project and the other way round for an inefficient spillover.
Moreover, we examined how the incentives of both parties can be con-
trolled through the determination of the ownership structure in an interna-
tional joint venture. We showed that there are circumstances where a joint
venture is mutually beneficial and thus the MNE voluntarily agrees to it.
Interestingly, however, we found that it can be efficient for the host country
to restrict its ownership share in the joint venture. Furthermore, there are
circumstances where it is not in the interest of the host country nor effi-
cient at all to share ownership. Hence, even though a spillover occurs in our
model only if the host country holds a share of the project, a joint venture is
sometimes not the optimal arrangement for the host country. This result is
particularly interesting to countries in Central and Eastern Europe and tran-
sition countries, where sharing of ownership is often required by host country
governments. The reasoning for these requirements is that in this way the
diffusion of knowledge is facilitated and economic growth is spurred. But we
show that exactly the opposite can be true, namely that the negative effects
on the incentive to transfer technology dominate or the cost of investment in
infrastructure is too expensive relative to its return. In these cases the host
country should actually prefer not to foster a joint venture.
The present analysis throws some light on the question of whether or not
the extent of local participation with multinationals has an impact on the ex-
tent of spillovers. As our model suggests, the extent of the effective spillover
depends not only on the ownership structure but also on the incentive to
transfer technology and on the host country’s policy. Theses factors, on the
other hand, depend on country specific as well as industry specific determi-
nants. Whether or not a larger ownership share of the host country firm in
turn leads to stronger spillovers is a priori not clear and can differ across
countries and industries. This observation may help to explain why the em-
pirical evidence on this issue is mixed. While Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm [1999]
found no effect, Dimelis and Louri [2002] found evidence that the degree of
domestic ownership matters with respect to the magnitude of spillovers.
Possible extensions of the model could include more sophisticated speci-
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fications of the bargaining game or the examination of the influence of other
market characteristics such as competition in the product market. It was
not the aim of this model to determine the optimal ownership structure in
an international joint venture. Despite these arguments we feel confident
that our model helps to explain determining factors for the distribution of
ownership in international joint ventures. A sounder theoretical approach to
this issue and empirical tests of the proposed hypotheses are left for future
research.
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Appendix
Lemma 4.1 For any α ∈ (0, 1), HC’s maximization problem has a unique
interior solution T T (α) ∈
(
−(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S,R− 1−α
α
βS
)
.
Proof:
We first show that HC’s profit function is strictly concave in T . By the
implicit function theorem, dq
T (T )
dT
= − 1
K′′(qT ) < 0. Differentiating U
T
HC with
respect to T we get
dUTHC
dT
=
dqT (T )
dT
(1− α)[R− T −K ′(qT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.5)
+S] + T
+ αqT (T )
= − 1
K ′′(qT )
[
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + T
]
+ αqT (T ).
d2UTHC
dT 2
= − 1
K ′′
[
K ′′′
[K ′′]2
[(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + T ] + 1 + α
]
< 0.
Hence, the optimal T T (α) must be unique. Furthermore, it is never optimal
to choose T ≥ R− 1−α
α
βS, because this would imply qT (T, α) = 0 and UTHC =
0, while a strictly positive payoff can be obtained by choosing T < R− 1−α
α
βS.
Finally, it cannot be optimal to choose T = T ≡ −(1 − α)β−αβ+α
α
S. To see
this note that at T = T we have qT (T, α) > 0.Thus,
dUTHC
dT
|T=T = αqT (T, α) > 0.
Hence, if α > 0, a strictly higher payoff can be obtained by choosing T > T .
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1:
By the implicit function theorem we can show that
dqT
dS
= − 1
K ′′
[
1− α
α
β +
dT T
dS
]
.
Using again the implicit function theorem and taking account of the direct
effect of an increase in S on q, i.e. − 1
K′′
1−α
α
β, we find that
dT T
dS
= −
K′′′
[K′′]2
dqT
dS
[(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S + T T ] + dq
T
dT
(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
+ αdq
T
dS
K′′′
[K′′]2
dqT
dT
[(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S + T T ] + dq
T
dT
+ αdq
T
dT
= −
(
1− α
α
β
) K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + 1 + αβ
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + 1 + α︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A>0
= −
(
1− α
α
β
)
A < 0, with A
≥
< 1 if β
≤
> 1.
Thus, it follows
dqT
dS
=
1
K ′′
1− α
α
β[A− 1].
Differentiating UTMNE and U
T
HC with respect to S and re-arranging we get:
dUTMNE
dS
= − qTαdT
T
dS
− qT (1− α)β
+
dqT
dS
α
[
R− T T −K ′(q)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.5)
−dq
T
dS
(1− α)βS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= qT (1− α)β[A− 1].
dUTHC
dS
=
dqT
dS
(1− α)[R− T T −K ′(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.5)
+S] + T T
+ qT
[
(1− α) + αdT
T
dS
]
=
dqT
dS
[
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + T T
]
+ qT (1− α)[1− βA].
Summarizing the effects:
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(i) β = 1⇒ A = 1⇒ dTT
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
,
dUTMNE
dS
,
dUTHC
dS
= 0,⇒ d(UTMNE+UTHC)
dS
= 0
(ii) β < 1⇒ A > 1⇒ dTT
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
,
dUTMNE
dS
,
dUTHC
dS
> 0,⇒ d(UTMNE+UTHC)
dS
> 0
(iii) β > 1⇒ A < 1⇒ dTT
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
,
dUTMNE
dS
,
dUTHC
dS
< 0,⇒ d(UTMNE+UTHC)
dS
< 0
For β = 1 we have dq
T
dS
= 0. Thus, it follows from (4.5) that for β = 1 we
must have T T (α) = T ∗− 1−α
α
S, where T ∗ characterizes the optimal choice of
T for S = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
By the implicit function theorem, it is straightforward to show that
dqT
dα
= − 1
K ′′
[
dT T
dα
− 1
α2
βS
]
.
Using again the implicit function theorem and taking account of the direct
effect of an increase in α on qT (T, α), i.e. 1
K′′
1
α2
βS, we can show that
dT T
dα
=
1
α2
βS
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + 1− α2 + α
2
β
+ α
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + 1 + α︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B>0
+
qS(T )
K′′′
[K′′]3 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + (1 + α) 1K′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=D>0
=
1
α2
βSB +D > 0, withB
≥
< 1 for β
≤
> 1.
Differentiating UTHC with respect to α and re-arranging we get:
dUTHC
dα
=
dqT
dα
(1− α)[R− T T −K ′(qT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.5)
+S] + T T
+ αqT dT
T
dα
+ K(qT )− qT [R− T T + S]
= − 1
K ′′
[
dT T
dα
− 1
α2
βS
] (1− α)β − αβ + αα S + T T︸ ︷︷ ︸
=K′′αqT by (4.6)
+ αqT dT
T
dα
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+ K(qT )− qT [R− T T + S]
= K(qT )− qT
[
R− T T + S
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ qT
1
α
βS︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (4.9)
A marginal increase of α reduces HC’s share of total surplus, qT [R − T T ]−
K(qT ), and reduces the received spillover, qTS. On the other hand, a
marginal increase of α induces HC to increase total taxation by dT
T
dα
and it
induces MNE to change investment by dq
T
dα
. Both effects sum up to qT 1
α
βS,
which is basically the direct effect of an increase in α on the investment qT .
This effect may dominate and thus HC may prefer to increase α, if β is suffi-
ciently large. Note that (4.9) can be positive only if β > 1. To see this, note
further that MNE will choose qT > 0 only if UTMNE > 0, i.e.
qTα[R− T T ]− qT (1− α)βS − αK(qT )− I > 0.
Condition (4.9) is positive if, after re-arranging, we have
qTα
[
R− T T
]
− qTβS + αqTS − αK(qT ) < 0.
Both conditions can be fulfilled simultaneously only if β > 1.
Differentiating UTMNE with respect to α and re-arranging we get:
dUTMNE
dα
= qT [R− T T + βS]−K(qT )− qTαdT
T
dα
+
dqT
dα
α
[
R− T T −K ′(qT )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.5)
−dq
T
dα
(1− α)βS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= qT [R− T T + βS]−K(qT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−αqT dT
T
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (4.10)
Thus, the impact of α on MNE’s payoff may be ambiguous. A marginal
increase of α increases MNE’s share of the total net payoff, qT [R − T T ] −
K(qT ), and reduces the loss due to the spillover, qTβS. On the other hand,
a marginal increase of α induces HC to increase total taxes by dT
T
dα
, of which
MNE has to pay the share α in case of a successful project, which happens
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with probability qT . If α is close enough to 0, the second effect vanishes and
MNE always prefers to increase α. However, if α is sufficiently large, the
second effect may dominate. The effect of a change of α on total surplus is
given by
d(UTMNE + U
T
HC)
dα
= qT
1
α
βS − qTαdT
T
dα
+ qT (β − 1)S
= qT
1
α
βS[1−B]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥
< 0 for β
≥
< 1
−αqTD︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ qT (β − 1)S︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥
< 0 for β
≥
< 1
. (4.11)
By proof of Proposition 4.1 we know that for β = 1, T T (α) = T ∗ − 1−α
α
S
and thus qT (α) = q∗(α), where q∗(α) and T ∗(α) characterize the optimal
choices for S = 0. Hence, equations (4.9), (4.10), and (4.11), and therefore
the effects of a decrease in α are the same for β = 1 and for S = 0.
Summarizing the effects:
(i) β = 1⇒ dTT
dα
> 0, dq
T
dα
< 0,
dUTMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUTHC
dα
< 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
< 0.
(ii) β < 1⇒ dTT
dα
> 0, dq
T
dα
< 0,
dUTMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUTHC
dα
< 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
< 0.
(iii) β > 1⇒ dTT
dα
> 0, dq
T
dα
≥
< 0,
dUTMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUTHC
dα
≥
< 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
≥
< 0.
We prove by example that there indeed exist cases with the properties de-
scribed in the proposition. Consider the following cost function:
K(q) =
1
1− q − q.
For α = 0.98, R = 40, and S = 3 the following results are obtained for
different values of β:
dUTMNE
dα
dUTHC
dα
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
qS T S UTMNE U
T
HC
β = 0.3 -0.25 -4.11 -4.36 0.65866 32.40 2.669 21.434
β = 1 -0.07 -2.72 -2.79 0.65855 32.36 2.665 21.406
β = 1.2 -0.02 -2.32 -2.34 0.65852 32.35 2.664 21.398
β = 3 0.43 1.23 1.67 0.65823 32.25 2.655 21.327
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Thus, for large values of α, there exist cases where MNE’s payoff increases as
α decreases. This result can be obtained independently of the efficiency of a
spillover β. For β > 1 there exist cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency
of the project increase as α increases. This is the case for β = 3 in the
example. However, for α = 1 and R = 40 we get:
dUTMNE
dα
dUTHC
dα
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
qS T S UTMNE U
T
HC
α = 1 - - - 0.65838 32.51 24.921 21.352
Hence, in some cases HC benefits and the efficiency of the project is maxi-
mized if ownership is not shared.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 4.2 For any α ∈ (0, 1), HC’s payoff is maximized at MM(α), with
(a) MM(α) ∈ (0,∞), if R > 1−α
α
βS and
d2UMHC
dM2
|M=MM < 0, or
(b) MM(α) ∈ (1−α
α
βS − R,∞), if R ≤ 1−α
α
βS,
d2UMHC
dM2
|M=MM < 0, and
UMHC(M
M) > 0, or
(c) MM = 0, if R ≤ 1−α
α
βS otherwise.
Proof:
By the implicit function theorem, dq
M (M)
dM
= 1
K′′(qM ) > 0. Differentiating U
M
HC
with respect to M we get
dUMHC
dM
=
dqM
dM
(1− α)
R +M −K ′(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.7)
+S
+ qM(1− α)− C ′(M)
=
1
K ′′(qM)
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + qM(M)(1− α)− C ′(M).
d2UMHC
dM2
= − 1
K ′′
[
K ′′′
[K ′′]2
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S − (1− α)
]
− C ′′(M).
Hence, HC’s payoff is maximized at MM(α), if
d2UMHC
dM2
|M=MM < 0 and if
moreover UMHC(M
M) > 0. Given the assumptions on C(M) there must exist
an upper bound for MM .
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If α < 1 and R > 1−α
α
βS, it is never optimal to choose M = 0. To see
this note that in this case qM > 0 and thus
dUMHC
dM
∣∣∣∣
M=0
=
1
K ′′(qM)
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + qM(M)(1− α) > 0.
Hence, if α ∈ (0, 1), a strictly higher payoff can be obtained by choosing
M > 0.
If α < 1 and R ≤ 1−α
α
βS, it follows from (4.7) that q = 0 for all M ≤
1−α
α
βS − R. Hence, HC chooses MM ∈ (1−α
α
βS − R,∞) if UMHC(MM) > 0
and MM = 0 otherwise.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.3:
By the implicit function theorem we can show that
dqM
dS
= − 1
K ′′
[
1− α
α
β − dM
M
dS
]
.
Using again the implicit function theorem and taking account of the direct
effect of an increase in S on qM(M,α), i.e. − 1
K′′
1−α
α
βS, we find that
dMM
dS
= −
− K′′′
[K′′]2
dqM
dS
(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S + dq
M
dM
(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
+ dq
M
dS
(1− α)
− K′′′
[K′′]2
dqM
dM
(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S + dq
M
dM
(1− α)− C ′′
=
1− α
α
β
K′′′
[K′′]2 (1− α)β−αβ+αα S + αβ
K′′′
[K′′]2 (1− α)β−αβ+αα S − (1− α) +K ′′C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E>0
> 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that the denominator has to be
positive by Lemma 4.2 if HC’s payoff is maximized atMM(α). And it follows
dqM
dS
=
1
K ′′
1− α
α
β[E − 1] ≥< 0.
Differentiating UMMNE and U
M
HC with respect to S and re-arranging we get:
dUMMNE
dS
=
dqM
dS
α [R +M −K ′(qM)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.7)
−dq
M
dS
(1− α)βS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ qMα
dMM
dS
− qM(1− α)β
= qM(1− α)β[E − 1] ≥< 0.
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dUMHC
dS
=
dqM
dS
(1− α)
R +M −K ′(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.7)
+S
+ qM(1− α)dM
M
dS
+ qM(1− α)− C ′(M)dM
M
dS
= − 1
K ′′
[
1− α
α
β − dM
M
dS
]
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + qM(1− α)dM
M
dS
+ qM(1− α)− C ′(M)dM
M
dS
= − 1
K ′′
(1− α)2
α
(
β − αβ + α
α
)
βS + qM(1− α) ≥< 0.
The effect of a change in S on total surplus is given by
d(UMMNE + U
M
HC)
dS
= qM(1− α)β[E − 1]− 1
K ′′
(1− α)2
α
β − αβ + α
α
βS
+ qM(1− α) ≥< 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.4:
By the implicit function theorem we can show that
dqM
dα
=
1
K ′′
[
dMM
dα
+
1
α2
βS
]
.
Using again the implicit function theorem and taking account of the direct
effect of an increase in α on qM(M,α), i.e. 1
K′′
1
α2
βS, we can show that
dMM
dα
= − 1
α2
βS
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S] + α− α2 + α
2
β
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S]− (1− α) +K ′′C ′′
− q
M(M)
K′′′
[K′′]3 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S]− (1− α) 1K′′ + C ′′
< 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that the denominator has to be
positive by Lemma 4.2 if HC’s payoff is maximized atMM(α). Differentiating
UMHC and U
M
MNE with respect to α and re-arranging we get:
dUMHC
dα
=
dqM
dα
(1− α)
R +M −K ′(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.7)
+S
+ qM(1− α)dM
M
dα
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− C ′(M)dM
M
dα
+K(qM)− qM [R +MM + S]
=
1
K ′′
[
dMM
dα
+
1
α2
βS
]
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S
+
dMM
dα
[
qM(1− α)− C ′(M)
]
+K(qM)− qM [R +MM + S]
= K(qM)− qM [R +MM + S]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
1
K ′′
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α3
βS2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.(4.12)
Thus, the impact of α on HC’s payoff is, independently of the efficiency of the
spillover β, ambiguous. A marginal increase of α reduces HC’s share of total
surplus, K(qM)− qM [R +MM ] and reduces the received spillover qMS. On
the other hand, a marginal increase of α induces HC to reduce its investment
in infrastructure by dM
M
dα
and it induces MNE to change investment by dq
M
dα
.
Both effects sum up to the second expression in (4.12). This effect may
dominate depending on the exact nature of investment costs.
dUMMNE
dα
= qM [R +MM + βS]−K(qM) + αqM dM
M
dα
+
dqM
dα
α[R +M −K ′(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (4.7)
]− dq
M
dα
(1− α)βS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= qM [R +MM + βS]−K(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+αqM
dMM
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
The impact of α on MNE’s payoff may also be ambiguous. A marginal
increase of α increases MNE’s share of total net payoff, qM [R+MM ]−K(qM)
and reduces the loss due to the spillover by qMβS. On the other hand, a
marginal increase of α induces HC to reduce its investment in infrastructure
by dM
M
dα
, of which MNE enjoys the share α in case of a successful project,
which happens with probability qM . If α is close to 0, the second effect
vanishes and MNE always prefers to increase α. However, if α is sufficiently
large, the second effect may dominate. The effect of a change in α on total
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surplus is given by
d(UMMNE + U
M
HC)
dα
= qM(β − 1)S︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥
< 0 for β
≥
< 1
+
1
K ′′
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α3
βS2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+αqM
dMM
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
Summarizing the effects:
(i) S = 0⇒ dMM
dα
< 0, dq
M
dα
< 0,
dUMMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUMHC
dα
< 0,
d(UMMNE+U
M
HC)
dα
< 0.
(ii) S > 0⇒ dMM
dα
< 0, dq
M
dα
≥
< 0,
dUMMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUMHC
dα
≥
< 0,
d(UMMNE+U
M
HC)
dα
≥
< 0.
We prove by example that there indeed exist cases with the properties de-
scribed in the proposition. Consider the following cost functions:
K(q) =
1
3
q3 and C(M) =M2.
For α = 0.98, R = 0.1, and S = 20 the following results are obtained for
different values of β:
dUMMNE
dα
dUMHC
dα
d(UMMNE+U
M
HC)
dα
qM MM UMMNE U
M
HC
β = 0.4 -0.92 -4.62 -5.54 0.423 0.242 0.05 0.11
β = 0.8 0.03 4.32 4.35 0.315 0.326 0.02 0.02
β = 0.9 - - - 0 0 0 0
Thus, for large values of α, there exist cases where MNE’s payoff increases as
α decreases. Moreover, there exist cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency
of the project increase as α increases. As the example highlights this can be
the case even for an efficient spillover. For β = 0.9 sharing of ownership with
α = 0.98 results in no investment by both parties. However, for α = 0.99,
R = 0.1, and S = 20 we get:
dUMMNE
dα
dUMHC
dα
d(UMMNE+U
M
HC)
dα
qM MM UMMNE U
M
HC
β = 0.9 0.19 0.18 0.37 0.298 0.171 0.02 0.03
Q.E.D.
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